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ABSTRACT
Although legislation is at the center of legal debates on statutory interpretation, administra-
tive law, and delegation, little is known about how legislation is actually drafted.  If scholars pay
any attention to Congress at all, they tend to focus on what happens after legislation is intro-
duced, ignoring how the draft came to exist in the first place.  In other words, they focus on the
legislative process, not the drafting process.  The result is that our account of Congress, the
legislative process, and the administrative state is impoverished, and debates in statutory inter-
pretation and administrative law are incomplete.  This Article seeks to demystify important ele-
ments of the legislative drafting process.  Descriptively, it provides a comprehensive typology of the
origins of legislative drafts, outlining the many ways in which drafts emerge.  At times, the
descriptive insights are surprising: for example, when a committee drafts legislation in a biparti-
san manner, it sometimes uses a “legislative notice-and-comment” process, sharing a draft pub-
licly prior to its introduction so that stakeholders can review the draft and comment.  At other
times, the descriptive insights add substantial complexity to our accounts.  For example, the exec-
utive often drafts legislation.  This creates a principal-agent drafting problem between Congress
and the Executive parallel to the principal-agent problem that emerges with delegation, but oper-
ating prior to a legislative enactment.  The Article goes on to explain why members of Congress
pursue different drafting processes and to explore the consequences of variety in legislative draft-
ing for theories of statutory interpretation, for identifying reliable sources of legislative history,
and for arguments about congressional delegation and judicial deference to agencies.
INTRODUCTION
Legislation is the central feature of the modern American legal system.
More than common law rules or constitutional doctrines, legislation shapes,
governs, and dominates virtually every aspect of modern life.  Laws permit
military operations and intelligence gathering.  Tax, monetary, and financial
rules keep the economy running.  Legislation authorizes regulations that
promote safe workplaces, protect children from choking on toys, and help
ensure clean air and clean water.  For administrative agencies, judges, and
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legal scholars who are interested in our “Republic of Statutes,”1 perhaps the
central issue is determining the meaning of the legislation that Congress has
enacted.  To that end, courts and commentators have engaged in extensive
and unending debates on theories and practices of statutory interpretation,
the sources and role of legislative history, and the practices of legislative dele-
gation and judicial deference to agencies.
Despite the importance of legislation to the functioning of the legal sys-
tem, the actual workings of the legislative process are little known and much
maligned.  Scholars routinely treat the legislative process with disbelief,2 if
not with outright contempt.3  One leading scholar has described the legisla-
tive process as “ ‘opaque,’ ‘awkward,’ ‘complex,’ ‘cumbersome,’ ‘highly intri-
cate,’ ‘strategic,’ ‘arbitrary,’ ‘nonsubstantive,’ and ‘tortuous.’”4  Perhaps
because they see Congress as crass, unprincipled, and chaotic,5 scholars and
judges have not focused their attention on learning more about congres-
sional procedures and operations.6  Instead, some argue that judicial inter-
pretation of statutes should focus on simple, administrable rules because
courts’ institutional capacity is far too limited to understand the workings of
Congress,7 or because these rules act as important coordinating devices.8
Others argue that canons of interpretation, even when based on “fictions”
about the legislative process, can be justified because courts have a duty to
ensure that the law is coherent.9  Still others argue that the goal should be to
1 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & JOHN A. FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES (2010).
2 See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY
OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 113 (2006); see also Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statu-
tory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70, 134 (2012) (“Some legal
scholars or judges are quick to say that legislative procedures are simply too complex for
lawyers or judges.”).
3 See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the
Supermajoritarian Difficulty, and the Separation of Powers, 99 GEO. L.J. 1119, 1138 (2011) (“Aca-
demic textualists’ most ardent supporters are resolutely pessimistic (if not contemptuous)
about the legislative process.”).
4 See id. at 1138 (quoting John F. Manning, Textualism and Legislative Intent, 91 VA. L.
REV. 419, 431, 438 (2005) (“tortuous”); id. at 423, 430 n.34, 431, 444 n.84, 450 (“opaque”);
id. at 424, 429 n.30, 430, 438 n.64, 448 n.96, 450 (“complex”); id. at 423, 426 n.23, 431
(“cumbersome”); id. at 432 & n.43 (“strategic”); id. at 431, 432 n.43 (“arbitrary”); id. at
420, 425, 445 (“awkward”); id. at 431, 432 (“nonsubstantive”); id. at 431 (“highly
intricate”)).
5 Id. at 1139; Nourse, supra note 2, at 86.
6 Robert A. Katzmann, Statutes, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 637, 645 (2012) (“[T]here has been
scant consideration given to what I think is critical as courts discharge their interpretative
task—an appreciation of how Congress actually functions . . . .”).
7 Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH. L. REV.
885, 887, 921–22, 928–31 (2003).
8 Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Mean-
ing, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232 (advocating the plain meaning rule as a “second-best
coordinating device”).
9 See, e.g., Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 133 S. Ct. 735, 744 (2013) (“Consistency of
interpretation of related state and federal laws is a virtue in that it helps to create simplicity
making the law easier to understand and to follow for lawyers and for nonlawyers alike.”);
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force Congress to draft legislation more clearly.10  These approaches are par-
ticularly surprising because few legal scholars or practitioners, if any, would
argue that judicial procedures and practices are simply too complicated and
that lawyers should abandon their attempts to understand them altogether.11
The central problem is that the legislative process remains seriously
understudied and severely undertheorized.12  This may be because law
school education rarely focuses much on legislation,13 or because few in the
legal academy or on the bench have worked in the legislature.14  Whatever
the reason, among legal academics, there has been comparatively little writ-
ten on the inner workings of Congress.15  In recent years, some scholars have
begun to dig deeper into legislative practices and procedures.  A few have
discussed the constitutional links to congressional procedure.16  Others have
identified rules of congressional procedure and practice that bear directly on
statutory interpretation.17  And in path-breaking articles, Professors Nourse,
Schacter, Bressman, and Gluck have conducted empirical research on legisla-
Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined . . . on the basis of which
meaning is . . . most compatible with the surrounding body of law into which the provision
must be integrated . . . .”).  For a more extended discussion of this argument, see Abbe R.
Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 961–64 (2013).
10 For one example, see Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 2169–70 (2002).  For other examples, see Nourse, supra note 2, at 77
(describing proposals for federal rules of statutory interpretation, revisions to the use of
legislative history, and other democracy forcing reforms).
11 Cf. Nourse, supra note 2, at 76 (“No one looks for the nine-Justice Supreme Court’s
intent in determining the meaning of a judicial decision, and no one need look for the
fictional intent of Congress in searching for the meaning of its decisions.”).
12 Katzmann, supra note 6, at 660 (“[Interpretive debates have] taken place in a vac-
uum, largely removed from the reality of how Congress actually functions.”).
13 Richard A. Posner, Book Review, 74 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1567 (1988) (reviewing WIL-
LIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILLIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION (1988)).
14 Nourse, supra note 2, at 73–77, 74 n.6, 85–87; see also Dakota S. Rudesill, Closing the
Legislative Experience Gap: How a Legislative Law Clerk Program Will Benefit the Legal Profession
and Congress, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 699, 706–08 (2010) (providing an empirical study show-
ing a “virtual non-existence of legislative work experience” among judges and top legal
faculty members).
15 Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congres-
sional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 576 (2002) (“Articles about statutory interpretation
fill the pages of law reviews, but the vast majority of this scholarship focuses on courts.  If
the scholarship looks at legislatures at all, it does so from an external perspective, looking
at Congress through a judicial lens.  Little has been written from the legislative end of the
telescope.”).
16 See Josh Chafetz, Congress’s Constitution, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 715 (2012); Adrian
Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 361 (2004).
17 See Nourse, supra note 2; Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the
Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014).
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tive drafting.18  These writings are notable because their findings demon-
strate not only the flaws of existing scholarship that relies on an idealized
image of the legislative process, but also the richness and variety of legislative
actions.  As Gluck and Bressman conclude,
The foundational scholarship of federal legislation has, for the most part,
been based on a generic and stylized account of statutory drafting—an
understandable focus for a field that is still in its relative infancy.  However,
there is great variety that exists across drafters, types of statutes, the reasons
why and ways in which Congress delegates, and countless other aspects of
the drafting process.  A mature theoretical account will have to contend with
that variety or else come up with better justifications for ignoring it.19
In this context, it is unsurprising that the origins of legislative drafts are
understudied.  Despite courts often referring to the “legislator” as the drafter
of legislation,20 the standard “Schoolhouse Rock!” model of how a bill
becomes a law is undoubtedly wrong.21  From interviews with congressional
staff, scholars have found that “there is no uniform process of legislative
drafting followed in all cases.”22  The standard scholarly account of legisla-
tion recognizes variety in the origins of legislation, but does little more than
simply assert that legislative drafts can originate with members of Congress,
the executive branch, interest groups, lobbyists, constituents, industry, aca-
demics, and local governments.23  Recent research has tried to identify the
relative weight of these sources of legislative drafts, based on the perceptions
of congressional staff: 25% of first drafts come from the White House and
agencies and 34% from outside groups and policy experts.24  Some accounts
note that bills can be drafted not just by different persons, but in different
locations, such as the floor of the House or Senate, or in conference commit-
18 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV.
725 (2014); Gluck & Bressman, supra note 9; Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15.
19 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 9, at 911.
20 Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15, at 585.
21 Schoolhouse Rock!, I’m Just a Bill, YOUTUBE (Sept. 1, 2008) https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=tyeJ55o3El0.
22 Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15, at 583.
23 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLA-
TION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 72 (2d ed. 2006) (“Once proponents convince a leg-
islator to draft (or accept their draft of) a bill and to introduce it, they must make sure it
survives the committee to which it is referred.”); JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHEN-
SON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 24 (2d ed. 2013) (“Many bills that result in major legis-
lation are proposed by the executive branch or significant interest groups.”); STEVEN S.
SMITH ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 97 (4th ed. 2006) (“Legislation may be drafted by
anyone—a member and his or her staff, a committee, lobbyists, executive branch officials,
or any combination of insiders and outsiders—but it must be introduced by a member and
while Congress is in session.”); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15, at 584 (“Respondents
told us, for example, that ideas for new legislation came from a broad array of sources—
newspapers and court cases, lobbyists and the White House, Sunday-school teachers and
law-review articles, to name a few.”).
24 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 758.
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tee.25  Only a few scholars have attempted to develop more systematic typolo-
gies of legislative drafting.  Professors Bressman and Gluck argue that there
are three basic bill types: omnibus legislation, appropriations, and ordinary
bills.26  Professors Nourse and Schacter have argued for four different draft-
ing processes: the extended drafting process (through committee struc-
tures), consensus drafting (which includes multiple legislators and their
staffs), drafting on the floor, and drafting in conference.27  Both sets of
scholars agree that the differences in legislative drafting processes could have
significant implications for statutory interpretation.28
This Article seeks to demystify important elements of the legislative
drafting process in the United States Congress.  It provides a comprehensive
typology of the origins of legislative drafts, explains the factors members of
Congress and their staffs consider in deciding which drafting pathway to
take, and explores the implications of the origins of legislation on legal
debates related to statutory interpretation.  The Article proceeds in four
Parts.  Part I addresses common misunderstandings and confusion about the
different actors within Congress.  It provides an overview of the structure of
legislator-staff relationships and describes the roles that members of Con-
gress (MCs), personal staff, committee staff, and legislative counsel play.
Emerging from this description is the reality that MCs are best characterized
not as drafters, but as decisionmakers.
Part II provides a comprehensive typology of the origins of legislative
drafts.  It identifies eleven different categories of the sources of legislative
drafts.  The typology first distinguishes between (1) drafts by legislators and
their staffs, (2) drafts through committee processes, and (3) drafts by individ-
uals or groups outside the legislature.  Within those categories, it identifies a
variety of species of origin stories for legislative drafts.  These origin stories
apply to legislation on most topics—ranging from legislative authorizations
on health care, to financial regulation, to national security.  The diversity of
approaches is rich, and some of these origin stories are likely to surprise,
such as examples of agencies and industry jointly drafting legislation and
then giving the agreed-upon text to Congress for swift passage.  It also dis-
cusses the role of legislative counsel and “technical assistance” from the exec-
utive branch.  While this typology is comprehensive, it is not necessarily
mutually exclusive or completely exhaustive.  Legislative staff are constantly
innovating, finding creative ways to advance legislative goals in a hotly con-
tested and complex political environment.  As a result, the origin stories
presented here can be combined, and new origin stories may emerge in the
future.  Despite this limitation, these categories nonetheless provide identifi-
able and consistent pathways for how legislative drafts originate—and with
far greater depth and granularity than has hitherto been outlined in the
scholarly literature.
25 Katzmann, supra note 6, at 655.
26 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 760–62.
27 Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15, at 590–94.
28 Id.; Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 760–76.
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With so many different drafting pathways, the obvious follow-up ques-
tion is why MCs pursue different drafting strategies.  Part III outlines a variety
of factors that are relevant in determining which drafting pathway is adopted.
There is no simple formula here.  The factors vary widely, from the purpose
of the bill to political considerations to individual idiosyncrasies of particular
MCs.  In any particular case, different factors operate with different
strengths, and different factors might cut in opposite directions.  But again,
these factors are recognizable, predictable, and consistent.  As a first step to
greater understanding, identifying them is critical.
The implications of this more granular understanding of the origins of
legislative drafts are significant.  First, as a simple descriptive matter, a more
detailed understanding of the varieties of legislative drafting deepens our
knowledge of Congress and the legislative process generally, critical compo-
nents of our constitutional system.29  At times, the descriptive insights may be
surprising; for example, when a committee drafts legislation in a bipartisan
manner, it sometimes uses a “legislative notice-and-comment” process, shar-
ing a draft publicly prior to its introduction so that stakeholders can review
the draft and comment.30  At other times, the descriptive insights add sub-
stantial complexity to our accounts.  For example, the executive often drafts
legislation.31  This creates a principal-agent drafting problem between Con-
gress and the executive that parallels the principal-agent problem familiar
from delegation, but that operates prior to a legislative enactment.32
Second, as a more complex functional matter, because most legal
debates in statutory interpretation and administrative law are predicated on a
view of Congress, the origins of legislation have implications for theories of
statutory interpretation, the use of legislative history, and ongoing debates on
the delegation doctrine and judicial deference to agencies.  Part IV suggests
some possible implications of the more textured view of legislative drafting
on these legal debates and identifies further avenues for research.
Consider theories of statutory interpretation.  The detailed analysis pro-
vided here has implications for both textualists and purposivists.  The com-
plexity and difficulty of understanding the pathways of legislation from
origins to passage might support a prudential argument for textualism, that
limiting analysis to the text limits the time and resource costs of interpreta-
tion and protects against mistakes.  On the other hand, for purposivists, the
descriptive account here provides a rich, discernable set of pathways that can
be readily used to identify congressional actions.  With greater understand-
ing, it becomes easier to use nontextual sources and more likely that use of
those sources will be accurate.  Moving beyond textualism and purposivism,
29 Importantly, the descriptive contributions here are independent of any particular
theory that explains the legislative process.  As a result, these descriptive contributions
should be of interest to those who adhere to public choice explanations, public interest
explanations, or other explanations altogether.
30 See infra subsection II.B.2.
31 See infra subsections II.C.1, II.C.2.
32 See infra subsection IV.C.1.
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all the leading theories of statutory interpretation—textualism, purposivism,
intentionalism—are universalist theories, theories that apply regardless of
particular legislative processes or features (such as committee jurisdiction,
legislative process, or subject area).  Recently, some scholars have argued that
statutory interpretation should be more granular, focused on particular, dis-
cernable congressional procedures and practices.33  Understanding the ori-
gins of legislation is a critical component to this emerging trend of anti-
universalist theorizing in statutory interpretation, an approach that is rooted
in the diverse paths that legislation takes.34
Greater understanding of the legislative process also improves the ability
of judges and scholars to identify the most reliable legislative history for inter-
preting specific statutory provisions.35  For example, if a statute is drafted in a
partisan manner through a committee, it makes sense to look at the state-
ments of the members of that committee of the drafting political party; but if
the statute was drafted in a bipartisan manner on committee, statements
from members of both parties might be legitimate.  Understanding the
source of the draft bears directly on the legitimacy of the sources used in
legislative history.  Moreover, the realities of the legislative drafting process
suggest that the comparative legitimacy and reliability of legislative materials
may be more dependent on MCs signaling that the materials are part of the
legislative record, rather than on the members actually drafting, reading, or
relying on those materials.  In other words, we need to start with the premise
that members of Congress are not drafters but decisionmakers.
Finally, understanding the origins of legislation requires revisiting
debates on delegation and deference to agencies.36  In the conventional
model, Congress passes legislation and agencies implement it, creating a
principal-agent problem in which agencies may drift away from congressional
intent.  However, in some cases, agencies and the White House are actually
the primary drafters of the statute, and in other cases they provide consistent
feedback and “technical assistance” throughout the drafting process.37  That
the agency charged with interpreting the statute actually wrote the statute
defies the conventional principal-agent model, and while it is likely that
scholars are generally aware of the phenomenon, it has not been discussed or
theorized at any length in the legal literature.  At least in some cases, this
departure from the conventional model suggests rethinking congressional
delegation and judicial deference to agencies.
I. DRAFTERS AND DECISIONMAKERS
Before delving into the various origins of legislative drafts, it is important
to understand the basic structure of a congressional office and the relation-
33 See infra Section IV.A.
34 See id.
35 See infra Section IV.B.
36 See infra Section IV.C.
37 See infra subsections II.C.1, II.C.2; Section II.D.
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ship of legislative staff to members of Congress.  Indeed, some theories of
statutory interpretation seem to be at least partly predicated on the role that
legislators and staff play in the drafting process.  For example, some textual-
ists have argued that legislative history is less reliable than the texts of legisla-
tion because legislative history, unlike text, is written by congressional staff.38
To evaluate this claim, it is essential to know who exactly does the drafting
and what role MCs play.
Whether in the House or in the Senate, four sets of people are most
important to the legislative drafting process.  First are members of Congress.
Members of Congress are elected representatives who have formal authority
to debate and pass legislation.  Second are personal staffs.  Each MC has a
personal staff that usually comprises legislative assistants (LAs), who each
have a portfolio of topics they cover, such as health care or education.39  If
the MC is a member of a committee, she may have a dedicated personal staff
member cover all the issues that arise in that committee (e.g. a foreign affairs
LA for a member sitting on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee).40
Often—particularly in the House of Representatives, where staffs are
smaller—an LA will cover a wide variety of topics that might span multiple
committees.41  Legislative correspondents (LCs) answer mail and are often
assigned to one or more LAs, serving as the junior staff member for that
subject area.42  In addition, MCs have a legislative director to manage the
LAs, press and communications personnel, constituent services staff, and
other administrative support staff (e.g., scheduler, chief of staff).43  The MC
hires the personal staff, and the “legislative staff” (the legislative assistants,
legislative correspondents, and legislative director) is the core team working
on policy and legislative issues (including drafting) for the member.44
Separate from the MC and her personal staff is committee staff.  Each
house of Congress is divided into committees, and each committee has its
own staff.45  The chairman and ranking members of the committee each hire
all of the committee staff for their side.  The result is that the entire commit-
tee staff works directly for the chair (or the ranking member), not for the
members of the committee in their political party or members of the commit-
38 Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15, at 608 & n.69 (“One of these claims is that legisla-
tive history should be rejected by courts because it frequently is drafted by staffers—as
opposed, presumably, to senators themselves.”).
39 1 CONG. QUARTERLY INC., GUIDE TO CONGRESS 596–97 (5th ed. 2000).
40 See id.
41 Id. at 597.
42 Id.; see also, e.g., Committee on House Administration, Overview of 13 Common
Staff Positions 6, https://cha-diversity.house.gov/position-descriptions.pdf (listing respon-
sibilities for a legislative correspondent as including “[p]rovid[ing] administrative support
and assistance to Legislative Aides”).
43 CONG. QUARTERLY INC., supra note 39, at 596–97.
44 See id. at 595–597 (describing the relative autonomy that MCs have in hiring their
personal staff, but identifying common structures and positions).
45 Id. at 590–91.
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tee as a whole.46  This is significant because although MCs and their personal
staffs work extremely closely with committee staff, it is a mistake to think that
committee staff are apolitical bureaucrats who work for the committee mem-
bers as a whole.  Committee staff work for the committee chair or ranking
member, and it is rarely the case that they are not extremely closely aligned
with their boss’s personal preferences and political agenda and incorporated
into their managerial structure.  As a result, MCs and personal staff do not
treat committee staff as they would treat fellow members of their personal
office.47  The same can be said for subcommittee staff.  When subcommittee
chairmen have funds to hire staff,48 they hire subcommittee staff who work
directly for them, not for the committee chair or the other committee
members.
Last is legislative counsel (“LegCo” in the parlance of Congress).  Legis-
lative counsel has historically been “mostly invisible” in the literature on
drafting and statutory interpretation,49 but recent work has largely demysti-
fied the role of legislative counsel.50  Legislative counsel consists of two dif-
ferent offices—one for each house—of professional staff dedicated to
drafting legislation.51  Legislative counsels are divided by subject matter, they
are nonpartisan, and they do not directly work for any member of Con-
gress.52  They work with staffs from anywhere in the chamber to draft, revise,
edit, and format legislation.53
While there is no universal framework for staff structures or processes,
there are some generalizable practices.  First, as a number of scholars have
pointed out, staff drafts virtually everything; members almost never write or
edit legislative text.54  Staff (committee and personal) are also the primary
46 YALE LAW SCHOOL, Working on Capitol Hill 5 (2012–2013), http://www.law.yale.edu/
documents/pdf/CDO_Public/2012_Guide_Body_Public.pdf.
47 CONG. QUARTERLY INC., supra note 39, at 590.
48 Id. at 592.
49 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 739.  The literature is limited. See, e.g., Harry
W. Jones, Bill-Drafting Services in Congress and the State Legislatures, 65 HARV. L. REV. 441,
443–447 (1952); Robert A. Katzmann, The American Legislative Process as a Signal, 9 J. PUB.
POL’Y 287 (1989); Frederic Lee, The Office of the Legislative Counsel, 29 COLUM. L. REV. 381
(1929); Shobe, supra note 17; B.J. Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting
Manuals and Statutory Interpretation, 120 YALE L.J. 185 (2010).
50 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 739–47; Shobe, supra note 17, at 818–35.
51 Shobe, supra note 17, at 818.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 826–829.  I distinguish legislative counsel from the American Law Division
(ALD) of the Congressional Research Service (CRS).  ALD often provides interpretations
of law, but they are not primarily drafters. See id. at 837.
54 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 9, at 906 (“Most importantly, current doctrine makes
assumptions about what legislative drafters know, and it is widely acknowledged (and our
study confirms) that members do not do the actual drafting.”); id. at 983–84 (noting that
staff draft everything); Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15, at 585 (“Perhaps unsurprisingly,
our staff respondents saw themselves as centrally involved in bill drafting efforts.  They also
richly described the role of others in drafting but consistently described staffers as having
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drafters of legislative history.55  Legislative counsel is sometimes, though not
always, involved in drafting the actual text of legislation.56  Because of their
technical expertise in legislative format and cross references, and familiarity
with legislative language in a specific subject area, they are often consulted to
draft, revise, edit, or format legislation.57  In the case of appropriations,
where the appropriations report is the relevant document (the actual appro-
priations bill is almost entirely numbers), legislative counsel is highly
involved.58  Because many pieces of legislation originate with committee
chairs or go through committee on their way to the floor, committee staff
have a central role to play in the legislative drafting process—and perhaps
the central role in drafting language for committee reports.59  Committee
chairmen and their staff also frequently shepherd major legislation through
to consideration on the chamber floor.  Personal staff are also involved in
legislative drafting.  First, they can draft, edit, and revise language themselves
for their MC.  Second, when the MC is not chair of the committee, they are
the link between the committee and the MC.  Personal staff covering farm
subsidies for a Senator on the Agriculture Committee, for example, will be in
frequent touch with committee staff regarding a pending farm bill.  The per-
sonal staff members are the ones who brief an MC on a bill’s progress, draft
floor speeches and colloquies, and write press statements.  They are also the
ones who (sometimes with outside help) will draft amendments to the bill as
it goes through committee.
Staff and members rely on four different categories of sources: formal
sources, public and semi-public sources, non-public sources, and cloakroom
summaries.  The most obvious category is the formal sources—legislative
text, committee, and conference reports.  Generally, MCs vote on these docu-
ments, and surveys suggest that many have not read and almost certainly have
not written or edited them personally.60  The second category is public and
principal responsibility for producing bill drafts.”); id. at 585–86 (“Most staffers indicated
that, as a general rule, senators themselves did not write the text of legislation . . . .”).
55 Nourse & Schachter, supra note 15, at 608 (“Respondents readily acknowledged that
staff, rather than senators, drafted legislative history.  Staffers regularly wrote committee
reports, floor statements, conference reports, and colloquies on the floor.”).
56 Katzmann, supra note 6, at 654–55 (“Although legislators and their staffs are not
required to consult with legislative counsel, doing so is prudent because a poorly drafted
bill can lead to all manner of problems for agencies and courts charged with interpreting
the statute.”).  See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 739–47, for a discussion of the
situations in which Legislative Counsel is likely consulted.  It is worth noting that Bressman
& Gluck’s excellent study may suffer from some selection and reporting bias, as Legislative
Counsel members have good reason to inflate their role and committee staff have good
reason not to criticize.
57 See Shobe, supra note 17, at 821–27.
58 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 9, at 980.  Legislative counsel usually draft the central
appropriations report, which is the guide to how appropriations are to be spent.
59 CONG. QUARTERLY INC., supra note 39, at 591–92 (noting that committee staff are
involved in drafting and that committee reports are “almost entirely written by staff”).
60 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 9, at 972–73 (quoting one survey respondent as say-
ing, “Members don’t read text.  Most committee staff don’t read text.  Everyone else is
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semi-public sources.  Congressional staffers and MCs frequently have access
to section-by-section summaries of legislation written by the legislation’s
sponsor (or by committee staff), one-page summaries designed to provide an
overview of the legislation for staffers, press releases that summarize the goals
and provisions of legislation, summaries written by outside groups (non-
profit organizations, industry lobbyists, etc.), or reports from the Congres-
sional Research Service (CRS).61  Note that some of these sources are delib-
erately designed to persuade, not simply to summarize.
The third category is non-public sources.  Congressional staff will fre-
quently engage in informal contacts via phone or email with the staffs of
legislative sponsors, academics, executive branch officials, or outside groups
to inquire about the scope or substance of legislative provisions.  In addition,
staff usually draft non-public memoranda to MCs relying on formal, public,
semi-public, and non-public sources; these memoranda will often summarize
and analyze legislation and make recommendations to the MC on whether to
support the legislation.  Legislative counsel work product and some CRS
analyses also fall into this category.
The fourth category is cloakroom summaries, something legal scholars
have hitherto not identified as a source in the legislative process.  Each party
has a cloakroom off the floor of the chamber, with a staff that helps manage
their side’s floor activities.  For many pieces of legislation—and particularly
for amendments to legislation—the cloakroom staff for each side writes short
summaries of the basic point of the legislation (or amendment).  These sum-
maries are available to the MCs while they are on the floor, and if staff have
failed to brief the MCs prior to a vote, these summaries may be the only thing
that the MC reads before deciding how to vote.  When there are divisions
within the party on an issue, there might be multiple summaries of the same
amendment, each with a different spin representing the views of the
subgroup.
The overall picture that emerges from understanding the workings of a
congressional office is that MCs are not drafters but rather decisionmakers.62
working off [the section-by-section] summaries [in the legislative history]. . . . The very best
members don’t even read the text, they all just read summaries.” (first and second altera-
tions in original)); Nourse & Schachter, supra note 15, at 608 (“Many staffers volunteered
that members did not even read committee reports, except perhaps those pertaining to the
bills they themselves had sponsored.  Many staffers also candidly acknowledged that sena-
tors generally did not read the text of bills either . . . .”).
61 It is important to note that CRS reports are generally not public, though they some-
times become public.  In addition, CRS produces informal, individualized analyses for
MCs.  These analyses are not public and, like legislative counsel work product, are seen as
protected under something like an attorney-client privilege.
62 The reasons for this might be many, ranging from the complexity and variety of
issues to the demands of fundraising and heavy campaign schedules.  For a discussion of
the time MCs spend fundraising, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST 138–42 (2011), and
Ryan Grim & Sabrina Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak
Work Life, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/
call-time-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291.html.
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They are managers of a mini-bureaucracy who set the direction for policy and
sometimes wade into the details of policy,63 but who rarely get into the tech-
nical work of legislative drafting—or into the staff work of drafting support
documents (like one-page summaries or press releases), legislative history
documents, or even floor speeches.  This distinction, of course, runs contrary
to the current doctrine on statutory interpretation.  But as Professors Bress-
man and Gluck have noted, “Interpretive doctrines designed to reflect how
members actually participate in the drafting process would look very differ-
ent, and certainly less text oriented, than the ones that we currently have.”64
II. THE ORIGINS OF LEGISLATIVE DRAFTS
Textbook and even scholarly understandings of the legislative process
rarely investigate the origins of legislative drafts.65  For the most part, schol-
ars assume that scholars, interest groups, or staff draft legislation.66  In fact,
the legislative drafting process is far more varied and textured than is conven-
tionally understood.  Legislative drafts can originate from a wide range of
sources and processes.  For scholars, understanding how legislative drafts
emerge provides greater clarity into how the first branch of government
works.  For agencies, litigants, and judges who rely on legislative history, it
changes and complicates the sources and practice of statutory interpretation.
This Part provides a typology of legislative drafting practices, outlining
eleven different pathways that lead to first drafts of legislation, organized into
three categories.  This typology provides a comprehensive understanding of
the primary ways in which legislation emerges, with illustrative examples.
Note that this typology is based on who drafts legislation, not on where they
draft legislation.  For example, legislation is sometimes drafted in committee,
on the floor of the Senate or House, or in conference committee.67  But in
each case, it is initially written by an actor: individuals, committees, or outsid-
ers.  While the location of drafting is important to understanding the legisla-
tive process and particularly for identifying the strength of sources of
legislative history, the focus of this typology is on the drafting process, and
therefore on identity of the legislative drafter and the implications that dif-
63 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 9, at 940 (“The majority of respondents described
their members’ involvement as taking place at the more abstract level of policy rather than
at the granular level of text.”).
64 Id. at 906.
65 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 23, at 72 (“Once proponents convince a legisla-
tor to draft (or accept their draft of) a bill and to introduce it, they must make sure it
survives the committee to which it is referred.”); MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 23, at
24 (“Many bills that result in major legislation are proposed by the executive branch or
significant interest groups.”); SMITH ET AL., supra note 23, at 97 (“Legislation may be
drafted by anyone—a member and his or her staff, a committee, lobbyists, executive
branch officials, or any combination of insiders and outsiders—but it must be introduced
by a member while Congress is in session.”).
66 See, e.g., ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 23, at 72; MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note
23, at 24; SMITH ET AL., supra note 23, at 97.
67 Nourse & Schachter, supra note 15, at 591–93.
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ferent legislative drafters have on the legislative process and on legal debates.
This Part concludes with a note on the role of legislative counsel and the
executive branch in providing technical drafting assistance.
A. Legislator-Based Drafting
1. Sole Authorship
Perhaps the most obvious form of legislative drafting is sole authorship.
On the classic story of “how a bill becomes a law,” a member of Congress will
draft and introduce legislation on a topic of interest or importance.  In previ-
ous times, members of Congress would actually draft and transcribe legisla-
tion themselves.  Thus, we have Henry Clay’s handwritten draft proposal for
the Compromise of 1850, which was voted down.68 Today, an MC’s staff
member will almost always draft sole-authored legislation.  The staff might
consult with legislative counsel, interest groups, and academic or policy
experts, or the staff might just write the language themselves.  Examples of
sole-authored legislation abound—from bills to rescind stimulus funds for
use in high-speed rail corridors69 to bills pushing for jobs in forestry.70
Sole authorship has important advantages for the author.  Foremost is
that the author gets full credit for drafting and introducing the legislation.
Introducing legislation is one way to demonstrate that the MC is fighting on
behalf of his or her constituents, which may help with reelection.71  Hence,
many sole-authored pieces of legislation relate directly to the particular
needs of the MC’s constituency.72  In addition to serving local constituents,
credit can also help an MC stake out territory in a specific issue area.73
Authorship indicates to colleagues and interest groups that the MC is inter-
ested in a particular topic.  Interest groups will be more likely to approach
and engage the MC thereafter, and out of respect, colleagues will usually
consult with the MC when they are thinking about operating within the MC’s
issue area.  Over time, MCs gain a reputation for expertise and leadership in
68 Henry Clay, Compromise of 1850, OURDOCUMENTS.GOV, http://www.ourdocuments.
gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=27.
69 To Rescind All Unobligated Funds Made Available for Capital Assistance for High-
Speed Rail Corridors under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R.
2811, 112th Cong. (2011).
70 American Jobs in American Forests Act of 2013, S. 891, 113th Cong. (2013); Press
Release, Sen. Jeff Merkley, Merkley Introduces Bill to Protect Forest Jobs (May 9, 2013),
http://www.merkley.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=cf7e7a5f-ed4e-4082-9144-
23f16bf39134.
71 See generally RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., HOME STYLE (1978) (exploring the role of con-
stituents); DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974) (describing
the importance of reelection); CRAIG VOLDEN & ALAN E. WISEMAN, LEGISLATIVE EFFECTIVE-
NESS IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS: THE LAWMAKERS (2014) (discussing legislative effec-
tiveness and relationship to constituents).
72 See, e.g., Everglades for the Next Generation Act, S. 414, 113th Cong. (2013).
73 VOLDEN & WISEMAN, supra note 71, at 168–78.
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the area, which has benefits in policy effectiveness and constituent service.74
Second, sole-authored legislation allows MCs to stake out a position without
negotiating with others.  Members of Congress often introduce “message
bills” to drive a particular political message or to try to reorient public
debate.75  Message bills may not have a high chance of passage, but they
serve the member’s political goals.  Third, sole authorship has the benefit of
speed.  Because the staff will not need to negotiate with staff in other offices
to come to agreement on legislative language, sole authorship allows MCs to
introduce legislation more quickly than other processes of legislative draft-
ing.  At the same time, sole authorship has an important drawback: because
the MC and her staff have not engaged colleagues or committee staff in the
drafting process, it may be more difficult for the MC to build support for her
legislation.
2. Legislative Partnerships
Just as drafts originate with individual MCs, so too can they originate
with small groups of Congressmen in cooperation.  Often, two or more MCs
will join together to draft legislation on an issue of shared concern and per-
spective.  Sometimes legislative partnerships feature two or more members of
the same party joining together to draft and introduce legislation.76
However, the most significant benefit of partnership is that it can lead to
bipartisan legislative drafts.  Particularly in a polarized Congress, bipartisan
legislation has political and policy benefits.  As a political matter, bipartisan
legislation often gets favorable media coverage.  For MCs who are interested
in showing that they are not extreme and obstructionist, but can find ways to
work across party lines (though this is by no means all members), legislative
partnerships bring favorable press coverage.  As a policy matter, bipartisan
legislation may appear to be (or actually be) more likely to gain support and
pass through the chamber.  When Congress is deeply divided, bipartisan leg-
islation signals an area that may be less politically polarized and thus more
likely to gain widespread agreement.
A recent example will demonstrate the benefits.  Senator John McCain
(R-AZ) was the Republican nominee for President in 2008 and is often a
fierce critic of President Obama’s policies; Senator Elizabeth Warren (D-MA)
74 Id.
75 For a recent discussion of message bills, see Editorial, The Bills to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES
(June 7, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/08/opinion/the-bills-to-nowhere.html.
For an academic treatment of “message politics” in the Senate, see C. Lawrence Evans &
Walter J. Oleszek, Message Politics and Senate Procedure, in THE CONTENTIOUS SENATE (Colton
C. Campbell & Nicol C. Rae eds., 2001).
76 See, e.g., A Bill to Amend the Grand Ronde Reservation Act to Make Technical Cor-
rections, and for Other Purposes, S. 416, 113th Cong. (2013) (introduced by Jeff Merkley
(D-OR) and Ron Wyden (D-OR)).
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is widely seen as a leading progressive in the Senate.77  In the spring of 2013,
McCain and Warren worked together to draft the 21st Century Glass-Steagall
Act, which they introduced along with Senators Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and
Angus King (I-ME).78  The original Glass-Steagall Act, officially the Banking
Act of 1933, was passed as part of President Franklin Roosevelt’s 100 days.79
The original Act separated depository institutions from investment bank-
ing.80  Starting in the 1980s, a series of decisions by the Federal Reserve and
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, in addition to court decisions,
eroded the wall separating different types of financial institutions.81  The Act
was ultimately repealed in 1999.82  In the wake of the 2008 financial crash,
there was widespread discussion of the need to reinstate Glass-Steagall.83  In
this context, it is perhaps no surprise that the high-profile bipartisan partner-
ship caused significant media interest behind bringing back Glass-Steagall-
like reforms.84
77 See, e.g., Jim Puzzanghera, Sens. Warren, McCain Propose New Glass-Steagall Bank
Restrictions Bill, L.A. TIMES (July 11, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jul/11/busi
ness/la-fi-mo-elizabeth-warren-john-mccain-glass-steagall-bank-regulation-20130711.
78 Press Release, Sen. Elizabeth Warren, Senators Warren, McCain, Cantwell, and King
Introduce 21st Century Glass-Steagall Act (July 11, 2013), http://www.warren.senate.gov/
?p=press_release&id=178.
79 Glass-Steagall Act (Banking Act of 1933), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
80 Id.
81 For a discussion of these and related developments, see generally Saule T. Omarova,
The Merchants of Wall Street: Banking, Commerce, and Commodities, 98 MINN. L. REV. 265
(2013); Saule T. Omarova, The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the “Business of
Banking”, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1041 (2009); Saule T. Omarova & Margaret E. Tahyar, That
Which We Call a Bank: Revisiting the History of Bank Holding Company Regulation in the United
States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 113 (2011).
82 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999), Pub. L.
No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09
(2012)).
83 See, e.g., Daniel Gross, Shattering the Glass-Steagall, SLATE (Sept. 15, 2008), http://
www.slate.com/articles/business/moneybox/2008/09/shattering_the_glasssteagall.html;
Cyrus Sanati, 10 Years Later, Looking at the Repeal of Glass-Steagall, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK
(Nov. 12, 2009), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/11/12/10-years-later-looking-at-
repeal-of-glass-steagall/?_r=0; Robert Weissman, Reflections on Glass-Steagall and Maniacal
Deregulation, COMMON DREAMS (Nov. 12, 2009), http://www.commondreams.org/view/
2009/11/12-8.
84 See, e.g., Puzzanghera, supra note 77 (“Warren (D-Mass.), an outspoken liberal, and
McCain (R-Ariz.), a conservative who was his party’s 2008 presidential nominee, are an
unlikely pair.  But they are united in the belief that separating traditional deposit-taking
from investment activities would reduce risk in the banking system and lessen the chance
of future bailouts.”); see also Carter Dougherty & Cheyenne Hopkins, Warren Joins McCain
to Push New Glass-Steagall Law for Banks, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2013), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2013-07-11/warren-joins-mccain-to-push-new-glass-steagall-bill-for-
banks; Jim Lardner, Wall Street’s Weak Arguments Against a New Glass-Steagall, U.S. NEWS (July
31, 2013), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/economic-intelligence/2013/07/31/
elizabeth-warren-and-john-mccain-make-the-case-for-a-new-glass-steagall; Dylan Matthews,
Elizabeth Warren and John McCain Want Glass-Steagall Back.  Should you?, WASH. POST WONK-
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3. Legislative Gangs
A relative of the legislative partnership is the legislative gang.  On many
of the most high profile, politically charged issues of the day, a group of
legislators of both parties will form a “gang” to hammer out a compromise
that can gain support from enough members to pass.  These gangs have
become common: the 2013 Gang of Eight on immigration reform; the 2005
Gang of Fourteen on filibuster reform; the 2007 Gang of Twelve on immigra-
tion reform; the 2011 Gang of Six on deficit reduction; the 2008 Gang of Ten
on energy; and the 2009 Gang of Six on health care.85
Superficially, legislative gangs are a subset of legislative partnerships—a
mere grouping of legislators working together on an issue.  In practice, how-
ever, legislative gangs are different in significant ways.  First, legislative gangs
arise only in the Senate, because the House of Representatives’ structure cre-
ates a strong majoritarian system with centralized power.  Second, the “gang”
formulation is only used when the issue is of great salience and when an
agreement is more likely to lead to passage.  In contrast, legislation arising
out of partnerships may be—like all legislation—unlikely to be enacted into
law.86
Perhaps most interestingly, the use of legislative gangs differs from com-
mon political science models of legislative behavior.  Political scientists have
offered a variety of theories to explain when legislation is likely to pass.  The
BLOG (July 12, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/12
/elizabeth-warren-and-john-mccain-want-glass-steagall-back-should-you/.
85 See, e.g., David R. Stras, Understanding the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX.
L. REV. 1033, 1076 (2008) (book review) (noting that in May 2005, the Senate’s Gang of
Fourteen “crafted a political solution to a seemingly intractable political problem over use
of the filibuster against judicial nominees”); Kara L. Wild, Comment, The New Sanctuary
Movement: When Moral Mission Means Breaking the Law, and the Consequences for Churches and
Illegal Immigrants, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 981, 1006–07, 1007 n.219 (2010) (observing that
the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007, S. 1348, 110th Cong. (2007), had the
“enthusiastic support of a bipartisan group of Senators” known as the Gang of Twelve);
Obama Endorses ‘Gang of Six’ Deficit Plan, NBCNEWS.COM (July 20, 2011, 8:22 AM), http://
www.nbcnews.com/id/43807163/ns/politics-capitol_hill/t/obama-endorses-gang-six-defi
cit-plan/#.UldqvWTXi3M (describing the efforts of the Senate’s 2011 Gang of Six to for-
mulate a successful deficit reduction plan); Eric Randall, The U.S. Senate’s “Gang” Problem,
THE ATLANTIC WIRE (July 20, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2011/07/us-
senate-gang-problem/40199/ (noting that the Senate’s 2008 Gang of Ten failed to accom-
plish its goal of resolving energy policy); Robert Reich, Why the Gang of Six Is Deciding Health
Care for Three Hundred Million of Us, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 21, 2009), http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/robert-reich/why-the-gang-of-six-is-de_b_265684.html (“Last night,
the so-called [2009 Senate Finance Committee’s] ‘gang of six’ . . . reaffirmed their commit-
ment ‘toward a bipartisan health-care reform bill’ . . . .”); Rachel Weiner, Immigration’s
Gang of 8: Who are they?, WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/01/28/immigrations-gang-of-8-who-are-they/ (“There’s a new
bipartisan gang in town known as the Gang of 8: Eight senators who will unveil an immigra-
tion overhaul . . . .”).
86 VOLDEN & WISEMAN, supra note 71, at 27 (“[O]nly about one in twenty bills becomes
a law.”).
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most prominent are majoritarian theories, under which legislation passes
when a party has a majority of votes in the chamber to guarantee passage;87
median voter theory, in which MCs must gain the support of the median
legislator in order to guarantee passage;88 and pivotal politics theory, in
which MCs must be able to gain the support of the legislator whose vote is
needed to defeat a filibuster or override a presidential veto.89  In each of
these cases, legislators are lined up based on their preferred policy (e.g.,
from strongly supporting immigration reform to strongly opposing it).90
Although legislative gangs might still need to satisfy the median or pivotal
legislator, their use does not exactly fit the conventional approach because it
stresses the importance of balancing various power bases within the legisla-
tive body.  Take the 2013 immigration reform bill, for example.  The Gang of
Eight in that case comprised Senators Michael Bennett (D-CO), Richard
Durbin (D-IL), Jeff Flake (R-AZ), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), John McCain (R-
AZ), Bob Menendez (D-NJ), Marco Rubio (R-FL), and Chuck Schumer (D-
NY).91  On a conventional measure of partisanship in the Senate, only a few
of the Gang of Eight are among the centrist votes closest to bringing the
Democratic majority to the sixty votes needed to defeat a filibuster.92  Nor
can the composition of the Gang of Eight be explained by seniority, as Sena-
tor Flake was a freshman member of the Senate.93  Nor can it be explained
by geographic diversity, as Senators McCain and Flake both represent Ari-
zona; or committee membership, as Bennett, Menendez, McCain, and Rubio
are not on the Judiciary Committee.94  In fact, the Gang of Eight’s composi-
tion shows attentiveness to geography, representation for sub-groups within
parties, members’ level of interest, and formal and informal leadership
within the party.
B. Committee-Based Drafting
Legislative drafts do not just originate with members of Congress and
their staffs.  The organization of Congress into committees with jurisdictional
authority gives committees—and particularly committee staff—a central role
in the legislative drafting process.  In addition to legislators having a personal
staff, with staff members covering different policy issues, each committee has
87 See DAVID W. ROHDE, PARTIES AND LEADERS IN THE POSTREFORM HOUSE (1991); E.E.
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, PARTY GOVERNMENT (1942).
88 See DUNCAN BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES AND ELECTIONS (1958).
89 KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS (1998).
90 Id.
91 Weiner, supra note 85.
92 Only three are close: McCain is ranked fifty-seventh, Flake is sixty-third, and Gra-
ham is fifty-ninth.  For the full rankings from 2013, see Senate Ratings, NAT. J., http://
www.nationaljournal.com/free/document/download/5077-1.
93 About, JEFFFLAKE.COM, http://jeffflake.com/ (“Jeff began serving in the United
States Senate in 2013.”).
94 Committee Members, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, http://
www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/members.
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a staff.  Committee staff are allocated differently based on the committee.
Sometimes committee chairs and ranking members hire all of the respective
majority and minority staff members.95  Other times, subcommittee chairs
and ranking members may be able to hire their own staff.96
1. Partisan Committee Drafting
Some legislation is drafted through a committee-led, partisan process
with the goal of developing legislation that every member of the committee
(on the majority or minority side) will support.97  On this model, majority or
minority committee staff will convene the relevant staffer from each MC’s
personal office who is on the committee and of the same political party.  This
group is usually referred to by party, issue area, and staff title (e.g., Republi-
can Environment and Energy LAs, Democratic Banking LAs), and they meet
regularly so members are informed about the committee’s business.  When
the committee embarks on partisan committee drafting, staffers gather fre-
quently to discuss the goals of the legislation and the policy preferences of
each member, debate outlines of legislation, and eventually discuss and
revise particular legislative language.  All of this work takes place at the staff
level.  Committee staff usually organize the meeting, drive the conversation,
and provide draft outlines and draft language (in consultation with legislative
counsel), based on the conversations with staffers from each office.  Each
member’s personal staffer reports back to their office (usually to the legisla-
tive director and MC), summarizing the developments of the most recent
meetings, and then the staffer works to identify priorities and strategy for
future meetings.  If individual members have previously introduced sole-
authored legislation or jointly authored legislation that is relevant to the
topic, they may try to insert that legislation into the legislative draft.  In addi-
tion, the committee staff and personal staff will usually engage the opinions
of stakeholders, who are constituents or sympathetic to their perspective on
the issue.  Partisan committee drafting also has a strategic component: by
“grabbing the pen,” the majority or minority committee can set the agenda
for future negotiations with the other side.
As an example of partisan committee drafting, consider the legislative
drafts for the 2013 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Educa-
tion Act (ESEA).  In the spring of 2013, the Republicans and Democrats on
the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee each
introduced different versions of the reauthorization—versions that every
95 CONG. QUARTERLY INC., supra note 39, at 592 (“The chairman or the top-ranking
minority party member of a committee selects most committee employees, as a prerequi-
site of office, subject only to nominal approval by the full committee.”).
96 C. LAWRENCE EVANS, LEADERSHIP IN COMMITTEE: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF LEADER-
SHIP BEHAVIOR IN THE U. S. SENATE 33 (2001) (discussing subcommittee chair control of
subcommittee staff).
97 Note that what might appear to be partisan committee drafting is sometimes sole
authorship, when the committee chair or ranking member produces a draft on her own
and then sells it to their partisan committee members.
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committee member of each party supported.98  The Democratic version was
drafted through a committee-led process, in which committee staff worked
with personal staff from each office through successive drafts of the legisla-
tion, including making specific wording changes in response to concerns
from committee members.  The Democratic draft also featured sections that
were based on individual members’ sole-authored legislation.  For example,
Senator Al Franken (D-MN) introduced the Accelerated Learning Act of
2013 on May 23, 2013.99  That stand-alone bill appears virtually word-for-
word in the Democratic draft of the ESEA reauthorization as Subpart 2 of
Title I, Part B.100
2. Bipartisan Committee Drafting
Similar to the partisan committee drafting process is the bipartisan com-
mittee drafting process.  On this model, committee staff from both parties
convene the personal staff for committee members (e.g., all the health legis-
lative assistants), and the group of all staff meets frequently to develop the
legislative draft.  As with the partisan committee process, the entire group
considers the goals and structure of the legislation, comes to agreement on
policy issues, and eventually works through specific legislative language (put
together with the help of legislative counsel).  Bipartisan committee drafting
has some obvious challenges.  Foremost, there is greater difficulty getting all
members to agreement.  Second, although meetings and negotiations involve
the entire bipartisan staff, the majority and minority staff directors need to
have a trusted working relationship.  The committee staff directors are
involved in something akin to what game theorists call a two-level game.101
The Level I game is her negotiations with the opposing party’s committee
staff director, in which she looks to find common ground and ensures that
negotiations are in good faith and do not break down.  The Level II game is
her negotiation with the individual staff members representing MCs in the
committee staff deliberations.  The committee staff director needs to find a
win-set that incorporates both Level I and II constraints.  Committee staff
therefore often meet at Level II (partisan committee staff and personal staff)
98 Strengthening America’s Schools Act of 2013, S. 1094, 113th Cong. (2013); see also
Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Harkin, HELP
Committee Democrats Introduce Bill to Prepare All Children for Success and Fix “No
Child Left Behind”  (June 4, 2013), http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/
release/?id=E561493c-1cc4-46ba-8e8d-b427b82891be.  The Republican version was intro-
duced as a substitute in committee, which all of the Republicans on the Senate committee
supported. See S. REP. NO. 113-113 (2013), https://beta.congress.gov/congressional-
report/113th-congress/senate-report/113/1.
99 Accelerated Learning Act of 2013, S. 1082, 113th Cong. (2013); Sen. Franken
Introduces Bill to Help Make College Affordable, Improve Opportunities for Students, AL FRANKEN,
U.S. SENATOR FOR MINN. (May 23, 2013), http://www.franken.senate.gov/
?p=hot_topic&id=2424.
100 See S. 1094, at §§ 1221–26.
101 Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42
INT’L ORG. 427 (1988).
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in order to discuss issues and determine a strategy that they can bring into
the Level I bipartisan negotiations.
A third feature is the role of interest groups, or stakeholders.  In biparti-
san committee drafting, the number and variety of stakeholders are greater
than in partisan committee drafting, as every member on the committee has
constituents and interest groups that they respect or from whom they seek
support.  Perhaps most interesting is that staffers have developed processes
that we can think of as “legislative notice-and-comment.”  This process
engages stakeholders in ways similar to the legislative hearings that MCs
engage in and to the notice-and-comment process that administrative agen-
cies follow.102  The bipartisan staffs will often gather with a panel of experts
or stakeholder representatives (including sometimes members of relevant
executive branch agencies) to discuss their ideas.  Usually, the panel mem-
bers make an opening presentation or statement (just as committee hearing
witnesses do for MCs) and then the bipartisan staff members can ask ques-
tions (just as MCs do in a legislative hearing).  Unlike hearings in which MCs
participate, these sessions are not focused on a public audience.  Rather,
these private sessions are frequently technical and are genuinely focused on
fact-finding: understanding the problem, the perspectives of stakeholders,
and the concerns and pressures in the area.  Then, once the committee staff
has a draft that most or all of the MCs have agreed to, the committee will
release that draft, prior to the draft being introduced as legislation, for a
comment period for stakeholders to consider the draft and to provide feed-
back.  At the end of the comment period, the bipartisan committee staff
returns to the draft and decides if there is need for further changes based on
what they have heard from constituents and stakeholders.
In 2013, the HELP Committee pursued this bipartisan committee draft-
ing process, with notice and comment procedures, leading to the Pharma-
ceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act.103  In the fall of 2012,
thirty-two people were killed after an outbreak of fungal meningitis, stem-
ming from drugs compounded at the New England Compounding Center
(NECC).104  Compounded drugs fell into a regulatory gray area.  In 1997,
Congress passed a law regulating the industry,105 but in 2002, the Supreme
Court struck down portions of the law relating to advertising as violating the
First Amendment.106  The Court, however, did not squarely answer the sever-
102 For an example of the foregoing process, see infra notes 103–112 and accompany-
ing text.
103 Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act, S. 959, 113th Cong.
(2013).
104 Pharmacy Compounding: Implications of the 2012 Meningitis Outbreak: Hearing before the
S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Margaret
Hamburg, Comm’r of Food and Drugs), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/
ucm327667.htm.  For comprehensive analysis of the outbreak, see The Meningitis Outbreak,
BOS. GLOBE, http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/specials/meningitis/.
105 FDA Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (1997).
106 Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357 (2002).
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ability question, and lower courts interpreted the decision differently.107
The patchwork regulatory scheme led to widespread underenforcement of
the remaining portions of the law.108  Senators attempted to reform the law
in 2007109 but failed due to heavy industry lobbying against new regula-
tions.110  After NECC, the Senate HELP Committee decided to take up the
issue and find a bipartisan solution.  Throughout the spring, committee and
personal staff of both parties worked together on the draft legislation, engag-
ing in meetings with stakeholders, and ultimately releasing a proposed legis-
lative draft.  The draft was not introduced by any Senator; rather, it was
posted online with a request for stakeholder comments.111  After comment
and revision, the draft was introduced as actual legislation in the Senate.112
3. Bipartisan, Bicameral Drafting
Perhaps the oddest form of committee drafting is the phenomenon of
bipartisan, bicameral committee drafting.  Selected staff from relevant per-
sonal offices and from the committees will meet with their counterparts in
the other chamber to reach an agreement on legislative language.  The result
is a bipartisan, bicameral draft that has the benefit of being likely to pass both
houses of Congress without trouble.  Note that this is not the conference
committee process.  This is also distinct from the “preconference” process, by
which amendments are negotiated to make each chamber’s legislation identi-
cal without going through the conference process.113  Rather, bipartisan
bicameral drafting can take place even if legislation has not yet been intro-
duced.  To see an example, return to the legislation on compounding.114
107 Med. Ctr. Pharmacy v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 383 (5th Cir. 2008) (ruling that the adver-
tising provisions were severable).  The Ninth Circuit had previously held that they were not
severable and struck down the entire pharmaceutical compounding provision, leading to
the Thompson case in the Supreme Court, 535 U.S. 357.  The Supreme Court did not
address severability in its opinion, leaving the Ninth Circuit’s position intact.
108 See, e.g., Thomas M. Burton et al., Pharmacies Fought Controls, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 14,
2012), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10000872396390444657804578052972230404046
(describing difficulties the FDA faced in enforcing the law after Thompson).
109 Safe Drug Compounding Act of 2007, 110th Cong. (2007) (discussion draft).
110 See, e.g., Burton et al., supra note 108.
111 See Draft Proposal on Pharmaceutical Compounding, SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC.,
LABOR & PENSIONS, 113TH CONG. (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/
press/release/?id=0aa068ee-4f2a-4e31-9fd6-39f4d7472a5a&groups=ranking,Chair.
112 Pharmaceutical Compounding Quality and Accountability Act, S. 959, 113th Cong.
(2013); Press Release, U.S. Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Harkin,
Alexander, Roberts, Franken Introduce Legislation to Clarify Oversight Responsibilities for




113 For a brief discussion of the “preconference” process, see Bressman & Gluck, supra
note 18, at 762.
114 For another example, see Press Release, Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor &
Pensions, Bicameral Group Announces Deal to Improve American Workforce Develop-
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 23  8-DEC-15 16:29
2015] the  origins  of  legislation 101
After the Senate HELP Committee passed the bill, the bill stalled.  Members
of staff from the Senate HELP Committee began working with their counter-
parts in the House to come to an agreement that both chambers would be
able to pass.  In September 2013, after bipartisan, bicameral negotiations, a
group of HELP Committee Senators introduced a new bill, the Drug Quality
and Security Act, which was a revised version of the earlier legislation—but
with the full support of the Chairman and Ranking Members of the House
Energy and Commerce Committee.115  Again, note that the legislative com-
promise did not take place during conference committee—and that neither
chamber had passed the legislation yet.  The negotiations took place prior to
these formal processes.
4. Reauthorizations
A variation on the partisan and bipartisan committee drafting processes
is the drafting process for reauthorizations.  Most legislation that is policy-
focused is an authorizing piece of legislation, providing the authority for an
agency to take on some kind of action.  Authorizations are in contrast to
appropriations bills, which actually provide funding for activities that have
already been authorized.116  Some authorizations expire after a period of
time, and Congress will then reauthorize the government programs with
whatever revisions or new innovations they seek.117  Reauthorizations differ
slightly from other drafting processes because they usually begin with the
existing text of the law.  Note that if an agency has residual authority, for
example, a reauthorization might not actually be necessary for the agency to
continue its programs.
A few examples of reauthorization.  The Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act (ESEA) is an example of partisan committee drafting that was
actually a reauthorization.118  The 2013 Water Resources Development Act
(WRDA)119 is an example of a bipartisan committee drafted reauthorization,
though WRDA departed from the ideal type discussed above in important
ways.  As an authorization for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers water infra-
structure projects, WRDA does not involve the same level of painstaking
cooperative drafting between parties; most of the bill is just a list of projects
ment System (May 21, 2014), http://www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id
=A6347a77-f014-4877-bd5b-47775a3f83c3 (describing bipartisan, bicameral drafting pro-
cess that led to the introduction of the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act).
115 See Press Release, Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor & Pensions, Broad Range
of Stakeholders Agree: Bipartisan, Bicameral Drug Quality and Security Act Will Improve
Drug Safety, Should be Enacted As Soon as Possible (Sept. 28, 2013), http://
www.help.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/?id=049ab377-a426-4dd1-90dd-b9b770de7
a65&groups=chair.
116 See BILL HENIFF, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS20371, OVERVIEW OF THE AUTHORIZA-
TION-APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS 1 (2012).
117 Id.
118 See supra text accompanying note 98.
119 Water Resources Development Act of 2013, S. 601, 113th Cong. (2013).
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that the Army Corps is slated to pursue.120  Indeed, WRDA also shows that
not all bipartisan committee drafting is without controversy.  A portion of the
legislation made changes to environmental reviews.121  Despite support from
the liberal committee Chairwoman, Senator Barbara Boxer, environmental
groups and progressive members of the Senate opposed these provisions and
sought to amend them when the legislation came to the floor of the
Senate.122
5. Multicommittee Drafting
Sometimes, drafting does not take place within a single committee.
Rather, two or more committees will work together on putting together the
first draft of legislation.  The reasons are formal and functional, but first
some background on congressional rules: in both the Senate and the House
of Representatives, newly introduced legislation is referred to one or more
committees based on the committees’ jurisdiction and the chamber’s rules.
In 1995, the House changed its rules to eliminate “joint referrals,” the simul-
taneous referral of legislation to two or more committees.123  Under the cur-
rent rules, the Speaker identifies a committee with primary jurisdiction and
then can pursue one of two kinds of multiple referral: sequential referral,
under which the legislation is referred to one committee, then another, and
so on; and split referral, in which the specific parts of the legislation are
referred to different committees.124  In the Senate, joint, sequential, and
split referrals are also allowed, but by custom, multiple referrals require
unanimous consent.125
The formal structure of committee referrals, particularly in the House,
creates an incentive for drafters to work across committees when drafting
legislation that spans across committee jurisdiction.  Members of Congresss
know that if they want to get legislation that spans multiple committees
passed, they will eventually need the assent of members of the other commit-
tees (either because the legislation will be split in referral or will go through
sequential referral).  As a result, sometimes drafters will want to engage in ex
ante negotiations with members of the relevant committees, so that their leg-
120 Id.
121 Id. §§ 2032–33.
122 See, e.g., Larry Schweiger et al., Water Protection: Federal Law Would Again Let Army
Corps Run Roughshod Over Environment, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (May 3, 2013), http://www.
mercurynews.com/opinion/ci_23168131/; see also NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, NATIONAL WILD-
LIFE FEDERATION ANALYSIS WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT ACT OF 2013 — S. 601 (2013),
http://www.nwf.org/pdf/WRDA/NWF_MemoS_601_WRDA_2013Final_40513.pdf; ROB-
ERT W. ADLER ET AL., NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, STRIKE HARMFUL STREAMLINING PROVISIONS IN
S.601 (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.nwf.org/pdf/WRDA/WRDA%202013%20Streamlining
_Professors%20Letter_Final_04-08-13.pdf (letter written to express concerns with sections
2033 and 2032 of the proposed Water Resources Development Act of 2013).
123 JUDY SCHNEIDER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30945, HOUSE AND SENATE RULES OF PRO-
CEDURE: A COMPARISON 1 (2008).
124 Id.
125 Id. at 2.
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islation can more smoothly move through each committee.  Even in the Sen-
ate, where multiple referrals are less common, MCs will want to engage in
such consultations across committees in order to build support (or at least
prevent opposition) to their legislation because it encroaches on the turf of
another committee.  A frustrated committee chair who was not consulted has
considerable power to delay or even block a bill on the Senate floor.
As an example, consider the initial drafting in the House of Representa-
tives of what ultimately became the Affordable Care Act.  The House Energy
and Commerce, Ways and Means, and Education and Workforce Committees
all have jurisdiction over health policy issues.126  In March 2009, in order to
prevent the “turf fights” that had (among other things) plagued the Clinton
health care reform effort in the early 1990s, the chairmen of these commit-
tees all agreed to jointly draft the legislation, which would then be intro-
duced into all three of their committees.127  By early June, they had
produced a first draft of the legislation, and after negotiations with the
House Democratic leadership and various groups within the Democratic cau-
cus, they ultimately reported the legislation out of each committee in July
2009.128
C. Outsider-Based Drafting
Despite the idealized understanding of Congress, in which all legislation
emerges from public-spirited legislators, scholars have long understood that
outside groups sometimes provide first drafts of legislation.129  For the most
part, scholars of legislation have identified interest groups and academic
experts as legislative drafters.130  But there are other sources of outsider
drafting.  The executive branch, for example, sometimes drafts entire pieces
of legislation and, in some cases, the executive branch and private industry
will even jointly work together to draft legislation.
1. Executive Branch Authorship
Despite the conventional understanding of Congress as the primary
source of legislation, often, the executive branch will draft entire pieces of
126 Committee History, HOUSE ENERGY & COMMERCE COMM., http://energycom-
merce.house.gov/about/committee-history (last visited Oct. 31, 2014); Health, HOUSE
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, http://democrats.waysandmeans.house.gov/subcommittees/
health (last visited Oct. 31, 2014); Workforce Issues: Health Care, HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. &
THE WORKFORCE, http://edworkforce.house.gov/issues/issue/?IssueID=9933 (last visited
Oct. 31, 2014).
127 BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE
U.S. CONGRESS 187 (4th ed. 2012); John Cannan, A Legislative History of the Affordable Care
Act: How Legislative Procedure Shapes Legislative History, 105 LAW LIBR. J. 131, 137 (2013).
128 SINCLAIR, supra note 127, at 188–90; Cannan, supra note 127, at 137.
129 See, e.g., Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15, at 587, 610–13.
130 See supra note 23.
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legislation and transmit that legislation to Congress.131  At that point, MCs
(or Committees) will take the draft, edit it, make revisions, and eventually
introduce it as their own.  But members of the executive branch write the
original draft.  The functional reasons why both MCs and the executive find
executive branch authorship valuable are not surprising.  First, members of
the executive branch have considerable expertise in the subject areas they
cover—likely far more than their counterparts in Congress—and they are
tasked with implementing the laws, so they have a granular understanding of
what needs to be improved in existing laws.  Second, members of Congress
do not have the resources, time, or personnel to thoroughly engage some of
the most complex policy issues.  Finally, for the executive, participation in
drafting has important policy benefits: it enables the executive to shape the
laws that it will be implementing (thereby aligning them with its policy pref-
erences), coordinate between departments and agencies that might have a
stake or expertise on the particular issue (with either OMB or the White
House taking that coordination role), and it allows executive branch officials
to help ensure that laws are not filled with mistakes and problems—at least in
the first draft.
This practice is longstanding.  During the late 1930s, executive branch
officials were highly involved in drafting legislation and even in ghostwriting
congressional reports and floor speeches.132  Edwin Witte, executive director
of Franklin Roosevelt’s Committee on Economic Security in 1934 and 1935,
went so far as to comment in 1942 that
[b]eyond question many important statutes enacted by Congress have their
origin in administrative departments and congressional action is profoundly
influenced by the wishes of these departments.  To my personal knowledge
this has been the situation as to substantially all social security legislation and
also, I believe, as to most of the agricultural, banking, credit, defense, hous-
ing, insurance, public utility, securities, tax, and much other legislation of
the last five or eight years.133
Witte went on to describe the close relationship between agency staff
and Congress, including agency participation in every stage of drafting—
from initial idea development to floor debates to final negotiations.134
Although MCs now have larger staffs, enabling staff to take a greater role
in drafting, the practice of executive drafting still continues.  In a recent arti-
131 There is some constitutional authority for this practice.  The President has Article II
authority to “recommend to [Congress’s] Consideration such Measures as he shall judge
necessary and expedient.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.  In spite of the formal authority, the
conventional textbook account of the legislative process does not adequately account for
the executive role in drafting the laws and legal scholarship has been insufficiently atten-
tive of this phenomenon as well. See infra Section IV.C.
132 Nicholas R. Parrillo, Leviathan and Interpretive Revolution: The Administrative State, the
Judiciary, and the Rise of Legislative History, 1890–1950, 123 YALE L.J. 266, 282, 339–40 (2013).
133 Id. at 340 (alteration in original) (quoting Edwin E. Witte, Administrative Agencies
and Statute Lawmaking, 2 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 116, 116 (1942)).
134 Id. at 340–41.
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cle, Professor Christopher Walker surveyed agency rule-writers and, among
other things, asked about their role in the legislative process.135  Fifty-nine
percent of the agency rule-drafters responded that their agency “always” or
“often” plays a policy or substantive part in the drafting of statutes within
their jurisdiction.136  An additional twenty-seven percent believed that their
agency “sometimes” plays such a role.137
Perhaps the best recent example is the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010.  In the
wake of the financial crisis and the election of President Obama, the Presi-
dent and Representative Barney Frank, Chairman of the House Financial Ser-
vices Committee, met in February 2009 and agreed that the White House
would take the lead on the first draft of regulatory reform legislation.
According to Frank, the President suggested that, given the complexity of the
issue, it would be better if the executive drafted the legislation.  Frank was
eager to accept that offer.138  Over the next few months, White House and
Treasury Department staff drafted first a white paper outlining the basic
structure of financial reform, and then ultimately an initial draft of the legis-
lation.139  Frank then picked up the draft and proceeded with the usual legis-
lative process of wrangling members and interest groups in order to get the
legislation passed.  During the negotiations, executive branch officials
remained involved, often discussing particular elements of the draft legisla-
tion with members of Congress and their staffs.140
2. Private-Executive Authorship
Legislative drafts can also originate from an agreement between the
executive branch and private industry, with consultation from other stake-
holders.  Perhaps the best examples are the User Fee Agreements (UFAs)
that fund and govern certain Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
processes.  Take the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA).141  Under
PDUFA, first passed by Congress in 1992, the FDA charges user fees to pre-
scription drug manufacturers.142  The fees go toward processing drug appli-
cations (and are supplementary to regular FDA appropriations).143  In
addition, the law requires the FDA to meet certain performance goals and
targets that are jointly agreed to by industry and the FDA and then presented
135 Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67 STAN. L. REV. 999
(2015).
136 Id. at 1037.
137 Id.
138 ROBERT G. KAISER, ACT OF CONGRESS 37 (2013).
139 Id. at 85–86, 115.
140 For a personal account of some of these conversations, see TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
STRESS TEST: REFLECTIONS ON FINANCIAL CRISES (2014).
141 21 U.S.C. § 379 (2012).
142 SUSAN THAUL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42366, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT
(PDUFA): 2012 REAUTHORIZATION AS PDUFA V 1 (2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/
misc/R42366.pdf.
143 Id.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 28  8-DEC-15 16:29
106 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
to Congress.144  The PDUFA has since been reauthorized four times, most
recently in 2012.145  The 2012 reauthorization process is indicative of the
overall model.  The FDA met with industry and stakeholders frequently to
come to agreement on legislative language, performance goals, and user fee
levels.146  In September 2011, the FDA posted the draft agreement on its
website, subject to review by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).147  In January
2012, the Secretary of HHS submitted new draft legislative language and the
performance-goals document to Congress, at which point the relevant com-
mittees took up the draft legislation, marked it up, and eventually passed the
legislation.148
3. Private Authorship
Legislative drafts can also emerge from private authors—interest groups,
industry, academics, individual policy experts, or bodies of experts like the
Administrative Conference or the American Law Institute.  In these cases, the
draft is passed through to an MC’s office, and the MC adopts the draft as her
own.  The practice is frequent, though examples tend not to be public
because MCs do not want to concede they let interest groups draft their legis-
lation.  Still, there are some examples: Citigroup has been reported to be the
author of the Swaps Regulatory Improvement Act,149 and Harvard Law Pro-
fessor Jeannie Suk has been reported to have helped author the Innovative
Design Protection and Privacy Prevention Act, legislation based on an article
she published.150
144 Id. at 1, 5.
145 Id. at 1.
146 See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Completes Work on Three Drug
User Fee Programs (Jan. 13, 2012), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAn
nouncements/ucm287723.htm.  For information on meetings with stakeholders, see
PDUFA Meetings, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/UserFees/
PrescriptionDrugUserFee/ucm117890.htm (last updated Aug. 13, 2015).
147 Patrick Frey, Acting Director, Office of Planning and Analysis, U.S. Food & Drug
Admin., Remarks at Public Meeting for the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA)
Reauthorization 7 (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForIndustry/UserFees
/PrescriptionDrugUserFee/UCM279724.pdf; ROBERT CHURCH & LYNN MEHLER, HOGAN
LOVELLS, THE FDA DRUG LAG 42 (May 18, 2011), http://www.hoganlovells.com/files/Up
loads/Documents/FDA%20Drug%20Lag%20seminar%20May%2018%202011.pdf.
148 THAUL, supra note 142, at 1–2.
149 Swaps Regulatory Improvement Act, H.R. 992, 113th Cong. (2013); see Erika Eichel-
berger, See How Citigroup Wrote a Bill So It Could Get a Bailout, MOTHER JONES (May 24, 2013),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/05/citigroup-hr-992-wall-street-swaps-regula
tory-improvement-act; Eric Lipton & Ben Protess, Banks’ Lobbyists Help in Drafting Financial
Bills, N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK (May 23, 2014), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/05/23/
banks-lobbyists-help-in-drafting-financial-bills/?_r=0.
150 Innovative Design Protection Act of 2012, S. 3523, 112th Cong. (2012); see Christo-
pher Muther, If the Shoe Fits, They’ll Copy It, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 7, 2010), http://www.boston.
com/lifestyle/fashion/articles/2010/03/07/should_the_law_protect_fashion_from_
knockoffs/.
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D. A Note on Technical Assistance
Regardless of which path a first draft of legislation takes, MCs and staff
can—and frequently do—get technical help in drafting, editing, and revising
legislative drafts.  Technical drafting assistance can come from a variety of
sources, including academics and interest groups, but the two central sources
are legislative counsel and the executive branch.  Until recently, legislative
counsel’s role has gone almost completely unnoticed.151  Recall that legisla-
tive counsel consists of professional drafters of legislation, organized within
each chamber of Congress and by subject matter.152  Legislative counsel can
be asked to draft entire legislation based on simple policy goals, it can be
asked to take a draft written through any of the processes described in Part II
and edit or revise the draft using their technical expertise, or it can be
ignored altogether.153
The second source of technical help is the executive branch, through
what is referred to as “technical assistance” (or “TA” in legislative parlance).
Technical assistance refers to help from the executive branch on specific
(hence technical) policy or drafting issues.  For example, the head of an
office at the FDA can tell congressional staff how existing provisions are
being interpreted, how a suggested draft would change that interpretation,
what the policy consequences would be, and how resource-intense a new pol-
icy would be for the agency.  Technical assistance can also extend to the
agency drafting, editing, or commenting on legislative language.  It is impor-
tant to note that the White House and OMB might not always pre-clear tech-
nical assistance; contacts between agency officials and congressional staff can
be extensive without rising to the level of importance or formality that leads
to White House or OMB involvement.  For example, seemingly innocuous
background like data on the number and frequency of inspections of an
industry and the cost of each inspection might radically influence congres-
sional staff’s thinking about the policy choices in a draft piece of legislation.
The practice of providing technical assistance is pervasive.  In his survey
of agency rule-drafters, Christopher Walker reports that 78% of drafters said
their agency “always” or “often” provides technical assistance during the legis-
lative drafting process—with another 15% believing that their agency “some-
times” does so.154  Despite its importance in the drafting process, technical
assistance has hitherto only been mentioned in passing in legal scholarship—
and even then, infrequently.155
151 See supra note 49.
152 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 739.
153 See, e.g., Nourse & Schachter, supra note 15, at 588–89 (“On some occasions, the
staffer would send a memo describing what the proposed legislation would do and then
would receive back a first draft from the Legislative Counsel’s office.  More typically, how-
ever, a staffer would prepare a first draft and then forward it to Legislative Counsel attor-
neys for what was repeatedly characterized as ‘stylistic’ or ‘technical’ input . . . .”).
154 Walker, supra note 135, at 1037.
155 See Carol J. Haley, The Minor Use and Minor Species Animal Health Act: Past, Present, and
Future, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 13, 22 (2006) (noting that “[a]lthough FDA was not permitted
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Congressional staff rely on executive branch technical assistance for a
variety of reasons.  Executive branch departments and agencies have consid-
erable expertise in their fields.  Policymakers and lawyers at departments and
agencies have a comparative institutional advantage vis-à-vis congressional
staff—and interest groups and academic or policy experts.  They are better
positioned to understand the interpretive challenges in a statutory draft, the
practical challenges likely to be faced in implementing a statute, the relation-
ship between the agency’s different statutory mandates, and the agency’s
existing financial and personnel resources and the resources necessary for
new legislative mandates.  Each of these factors is critical to successful statu-
tory implementation, and by virtue of the fact that they implement statutes in
a particular field—and are closer to the street-level bureaucrats156 doing the
implementation—the executive branch’s institutional competence in draft-
ing is significant.
Perhaps the most immediate implication of the availability and use of
technical drafting help is that professionals with policy or drafting expertise
are often involved in writing legislation.  In the case of legislative counsel, it is
unclear how much of an impact this has.  One recent study, for example,
found that legislative counsel members “had no greater knowledge of most
of the [substantive] canons [of interpretation] than the [non-Legislative
Counsel]” committee staff.157  At the same time, however, Legislative Coun-
sel are generally considered to have substantial expertise and institutional
memory when it comes to specific technical drafting practices, such as identi-
fying necessary cross-references, linkages to other statutes in the same sub-
ject-area, and language usage across a statute or multiple statutes.158  With
respect to technical assistance, the implications are more interesting.  The
fact that the executive branch—the very departments and agencies that are
tasked with implementing and interpreting the legislation—is helping write
to draft or lobby” for the Minor Use and Minor Species Animal Health Act, the FDA’s
Center for Veterinary Medicine “could and did provide technical assistance”); Uwe Kischel,
Delegation of Legislative Power to Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of United States and German
Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 213, 253 (1994) (mentioning that agencies can sometimes provide
technical assistance to MCs in the drafting process); Diana E. Murphy, Inside the United
States Sentencing Commission: Federal Sentencing Policy in 2001 and Beyond, 87 IOWA L. REV. 359,
391 (2002) (noting that the Sentencing Commission’s Office of Legislative Affairs provides
Congress with “technical assistance in drafting legislation that may impact the [Sentenc-
ing] Guidelines”); Lydia S. Amamoo, Note, Why Brokers Are Not Investment Advisors: ERISA’s
Fiduciary Duty Only Applies to Those Who Provide Investment Advice to Pension Plans, 9 CARDOZO
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 119, 146 n.144 (2010) (“The [Department of Labor’s] Plan Bene-
fits Security Division, for example, does extensive legislative work on the ERISA statute and
regulations including ‘providing technical assistance and support to congressional
staffs . . . .’”); Note, Toward New Modes of Tax Decisionmaking—The Debt-Equity Imbroglio and
Dislocations in Tax Lawmaking Responsibility, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1695, 1710–11, 1711 n.81
(1970) (noting that “detailed recommendations [for tax legislation] typically come from
the administration” in the form of “technical assistance”).
156 MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY (1980).
157 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 744.
158 Id. at 746.
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that legislation is contrary to the conventional principal-agent models of con-
gressional-executive relations.  The consequences of this fact are explored at
greater length in Part IV.
III. THE CHOICE OF DRAFTING PROCESS
With so many different approaches to the drafting process, the question
invariably is why a member of Congress chooses a particular drafting strategy.
The answer depends on a variety of factors, and these factors can cut in dif-
ferent directions.  For example, an important, complex piece of legislation
might be urgently necessary in a crisis.  The desire for speed suggests less
extensive drafting processes, but the need for sound policy and the complex-
ity of the issue suggest more extensive processes.  As a result, there is no
mechanical formula in making these choices, but it is still possible to identify
the most important factors.  This Part outlines the factors that influence the
decision of which drafting process to adopt.
A. The Purpose of the Bill
Not all bills are drafted with the purpose of enactment into law.  Often,
members of Congress know the likelihood of enactment is low, but they still
want to draft a bill for political, personal, or policy reasons.  These reasons,
independent of probability of enactment, can influence the choice of draft-
ing process.  Politically, a member of Congress might want to pass a “message
bill,” a bill that makes a political statement—sends a message—even if it has
little chance of enactment.159  Message bills might burnish the MC’s creden-
tials with an ideological faction or significant group of supporters, be useful
during an election year as a sword or shield against opponents, or might just
put a political stake in the ground to pull the public conversation in their
direction.  As a drafting matter, message bills might frequently be partisan or
sole-authored, and they are less likely to involve executive authorship or tech-
nical assistance.  Members also often draft legislation to address constituent
needs or preferences.  Thus, one frequently sees draft bills introduced by two
or more members from the same state.160  Bills driven by constituent needs
are most likely to be sole-authored or legislative partnerships (partisan or
bipartisan), with MCs participating based on the constituency whose needs
are at issue.  In addition, members introduce bills to satisfy interest groups.
When interest group preferences motivate MCs, private authorship by the
interest group itself may be likely.
Members of Congress have personal goals in drafting legislation as well.
Members often care about specific issues because of a personal connection,
passion, or area of expertise.161  More strategically, MCs sometimes have a
159 See Editorial, supra note 75; Evans & Oleszek, supra note 75.
160 See, e.g., A Bill to Amend the Grand Ronde Reservation Act to Make Technical Cor-
rections, and for Other Purposes, S. 416, 113th Cong. (2013) (introduced by Jeff Merkley
(D-OR) and Ron Wyden (D-OR)).
161 VOLDEN & WISEMAN, supra note 71, at 168–78.
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personal goal of adopting an issue as their own and being identified as the
leader on the issue in their chamber.162  As a result, MCs might introduce
legislation on a topic to signal to others that the topic is theirs—and as a
matter of comity, members in the same chamber, of the same party, will likely
defer to their colleague.  These personal goals all cut in the direction of sole
authorship in drafting.
Finally, members can have policy goals—independent of enactment—in
drafting bills.  Sometimes a draft bill is designed to build foundation for
future legislation—in other words, it serves as an on-the-shelf draft that is a
starting point for a future bill that might actually have the chance of passing.
Depending on the salience and ripeness of the issue, different drafting
processes might be preferable.  On an important issue that is ripe, a more
extensive committee process might be favorable.  On an obscure issue, sole
or partnership drafting will be more likely.  In addition, MCs can use legisla-
tion as a part of oversight.  Draft legislation can act as a focal point to push an
agency to revise its policies.  The bill places the agency on notice that a mem-
ber of Congress feels strongly about a topic.  In these cases, the drafts are
likely to be sole-authored, part of a legislative partnership, or privately
authored.
B. Legislative Politics
The insider politics of Congress are another factor in choosing a draft-
ing process.  A full accounting of factors here is impossible, given the con-
stantly shifting political context within Congress, but there are some
overarching consistent features.  Foremost is the question of whether a bipar-
tisan process will make the bill more likely to get the support necessary for
passage.  In the Senate, bipartisan drafting processes—partnerships, gangs,
bipartisan committee drafting—can help the enactment process because of
both perception (the appearance and reality of common ground) and votes
(the need to gain the votes of members from the other political party to
defeat a filibuster).163  In some cases, however, bipartisanship in the Senate is
unnecessary: the majority might have the votes or know that it will be unable
to get bipartisan cooperation at the drafting stage.  In these cases, partisan
committee processes or other partisan drafting might be more likely.  In the
House of Representatives, the strong majoritarian structure makes bipartisan-
ship less necessary, even for bills that have a chance of passing.
While it is often recognized that Congress is a “they” not an “it,”164
sometimes it might be more useful to say Congress is really composed of 535
“I’s.”  In a Congress of individuals, personal relationships often define the
choice of drafting process.  Some members of Congress might be leaders on
162 See id. at 136–37; see also JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC
POLICIES 39 (2d ed. 1995).
163 See KREHBIEL, supra note 89.
164 Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
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particular issues, have a large public platform on certain issues, or have credi-
bility or power (formal or informal) within a committee or in a chamber—all
of these are factors that can influence the choice of drafting.  For example,
consider a Senator interested in passing environmental legislation, but who
isn’t on the Environment and Public Works (EPW) committee.  One option
for increasing the likelihood of ultimate passage is to jointly author the envi-
ronmental bill with a member of the EPW committee.  The EPW member,
having a stake in the bill as a co-author, will be more likely to push the bill in
committee and attempt to attach it to bills that are moving toward passage.
Or take a message bill, intended for political purposes during an election
year.  Members of Congress might work with an MC who has a particularly
broad base of public support and gets extensive media coverage so that when
the bill is introduced, it gets more attention.  The result is that the bill
becomes an election issue and the MCs can trumpet their support for it dur-
ing their campaigns.165  While they will be partly overshadowed by the more
popular MC, they gain access to audiences they previously could not reach—
and the salience of the politically useful issue rises.  A still more personality
driven choice might depend on an MC’s interests and biography.  Recall that
MCs sometimes draft bills out of personal interest.166  If another MC wants
an ally in, or wants to curry favor with, a member who has a personal interest
in an issue, that MC might engage in a legislative partnership with the per-
sonally interested member.  The personal history of one member can there-
fore drive the drafting choices of another.
Finally, drafting choices are in part a function of the desire, or need, for
stakeholders to be involved in the process or to support the bill.  The various
drafting choices provide a spectrum of options with respect to stakeholder
involvement.  On the one hand are bills drafted through private authorship
by an interest group itself.  On the other hand are bills for which interest
group input is necessary (as opposed to simply doing the group’s bidding).
In these cases, any of the procedures can be adopted, as long as staff engage
with stakeholders.  Some processes, like the legislative notice-and-comment
process in bipartisan committee drafting,167 are relatively formal and involve
a wide range of interests.  Others involve fewer: a partisan committee process,
for example, would take into account the views of stakeholders that generally
support that party, not the views of stakeholders on the other side.  Still other
processes are informal: a staffer writing a sole-authored bill can engage with
experts and stakeholders to gain insight and input into the legislative text.
The critical question is which interests the MC wants to involve in the
drafting process.  Involving stakeholders has a few benefits.  First, early
involvement allows stakeholders to provide input and shape the bill, making
it more likely they will support it.  Second, early involvement enables stake-
holders to be ready to support the bill publicly upon its introduction.  Finally,
165 See Editorial, supra note 75.
166 See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text.
167 See supra subsection II.B.2.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 34  8-DEC-15 16:29
112 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
involvement in drafting makes it more difficult for stakeholders to oppose
the legislation strongly, even if they ultimately do not agree with it.
Note also that the legislative notice-and-comment feature is unlikely to
occur outside of bipartisan committee or gang-based drafting.  This is due to
the political dynamics involved in drafting.  Bipartisan committee drafting
and gang-based drafting enable a notice-and-comment process because both
parties tie themselves to the bill draft.  As a result, both parties can jointly
hear feedback, jointly make changes, and jointly claim they are being respon-
sive to stakeholders.  In contrast, consider the use of notice-and-comment in
partisan committee drafting.  If a partisan committee draft is made public for
comment, the draft could be attacked both by stakeholders and by members
of the opposition party.  Any subsequent change in the draft would amount
to the drafters backing down vis-à-vis the opposing party prior to engaging
them in legislative negotiations (remember that legislative notice-and-com-
ment takes place prior to the bill being introduced).  Moreover, the public
draft puts the drafters on record as supporting a set of policies that can then
be attacked by the opposing party.  These political problems do not occur if
stakeholder feedback is privately solicited.  They also do not occur in a bipar-
tisan process because both sides have already attached themselves to the bill;
any negotiation is only with stakeholders.
C. Sound Policymaking
The choice of drafting process is also a function of the desire for sound
policymaking.  First, the various drafting processes involve different levels of
expertise.  Most prominently, executive authorship or technical assistance
and private authorship place drafting in the hands of knowledgeable experts.
At the same time, the gains in expertise trade off against the principal-agent
drafting problem, under which the MC might not prefer (or understand
fully) the expertly drafted bill.  Second, drafting processes involve different
levels of diversity in input.  Some processes, like bipartisan committee draft-
ing, involve extremely diverse input from people of both parties, many
regions of the country, and different stakeholders (either directly through
comments or indirectly via the concerns of MCs).  Legislative gang processes
similarly can lead to diversity of input.  Recall that legislative gangs are not
necessarily centered on the median legislator or even the pivotal legislator.
They incorporate important members of each party, depending on the topic.
Diversity in drafting, as with diversity in decisionmaking, might lead to better
policy.168
D. Efficiency
Another factor is efficiency.  Some drafting processes are more costly
than others in terms of time, energy, effort, and speed.  Committee
168 See SCOTT E. PAGE, THE DIFFERENCE (2007); Adrian Vermeule, Many-Minds Argu-
ments in Legal Theory, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2009).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 35  8-DEC-15 16:29
2015] the  origins  of  legislation 113
processes, for example, are more costly than sole authorship, which in turn is
more costly than private authorship.  Pathways that involve multiple drafters,
bipartisan drafting, and committee drafting are more costly than processes
that involve fewer drafters, operate within the same party, and without com-
mittee constraints.  In situations where efficiency—and particularly speed—is
important, drafting is more likely to follow the less costly pathways.  In situa-
tions where there is less urgency and there is time to spend energy and effort
on drafting, more costly drafting pathways are more likely.
E. The Nature of the Issue
The nature of the issue in the bill is another factor in determining the
drafting pathway.  Depending on the importance and the complexity of the
issue, different pathways might be preferable.  When an issue is particularly
important or complex, the need for external drafting and stakeholder input
will likely be greater for two reasons: First, as a matter of good policymaking,
input from experts and stakeholders will help ensure the policy is workable
(or at least not unworkable).  Second, as a matter of politics, on important or
complex issues, it is often helpful to have external validators for the bill—
people who can vouch for the soundness of the policy against skeptics or
opponents—and to build a coalition that will support the bill even after it is
passed into law.  Thus for simple, symbolic actions, such as commemorative
resolutions, drafters are often individuals or legislative partnerships.169  But
for complex, major pieces of legislation, drafting often involves executive
branch drafting, input from interest groups, and an extensive committee
process.170
F. Idiosyncratic Influences
There are also idiosyncratic influences on the choice of drafting
processes.  Given that Congress is often best understood as 535 “I’s,” unsur-
prisingly MCs are sometimes rivals, sometimes friends.  Some have personal
preferences on whom they like to work with or how they operate.  Some are
steadfastly committed to ideology or bipartisanship; some are more prag-
matic.  Each of these personal characteristics can influence the choice of
drafting process—sometimes in irrational or unpredictable ways.
Importantly, these interpersonal relationships are also critical at the
level of the MCs’ staffs.  Staff members between offices might have a friendly
relationship or a rivalry.  They might have close personal ties, such as having
attended school together or having worked together on a campaign, or close
professional ties from prior work together on other pieces of legislation or
prior work as former colleagues for a single member of Congress.  These
personal relationships can also impact the choice of drafting process, as the
169 See, e.g., A Resolution Recognizing the 50th Anniversary of the Congressional Desig-
nation of Bourbon Whiskey as a Distinctive Product of the United States, S. Res. 446, 113th
Cong. (2014).
170 See, e.g., KAISER, supra note 138 (describing the Dodd-Frank Act legislative process).
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staff will often recommend a drafting process they think will be more likely to
proceed smoothly.
G. The Politics of Technical Assistance and the Principal-Agent Drafting Problem
Another factor is whether reliance on legislative counsel or the executive
branch to draft legislation or provide technical assistance in drafting will cre-
ate political dynamics that may be favorable or unfavorable.  Importantly,
technical assistance may not always be technical.  Because any legislation is
deeply connected to policy and politics, technical help also intersects with
policy and politics.
First, legislative counsel’s role and influence depends on the broader
political environment.  While some legislative counsel members are policy
experts with considerable knowledge and expertise (particularly in technical
areas, like the Social Security Act), others are not.  Their degree of policy
expertise does shape their influence over drafting.  Some staff even worry
that because of their lack of statutory expertise, they cannot evaluate legisla-
tive counsel’s drafts to ensure they follow the desired policies.171  At the same
time, legislative counsel can be constrained by politics.  Staff sometimes insist
on particular language (even if not technically optimal) for policy or political
reasons.172  When particular language—even if suboptimal—is required to
make a legislative deal or is demanded by an interest group who drafted the
language, legislative counsel’s role may be less effective.173
Executive branch technical assistance suffers from a different concern.
By consulting the executive branch, congressional staff create a principal-
agent drafting problem that scholars have not previously noticed.  Executive
branch members—the agent of the congressional staff for technical assis-
tance—have independent policy preferences based on institutional interests,
the President’s priorities, or their own personal views.  As a result, executive
branch members can use supposedly “technical” advice to shape legislation at
a substantive level.  One of the consequences is that congressional staff are
more wary of technical assistance coming from executive branch members of
the opposition party.174  However, this healthy skepticism does not mean that
technical assistance will never be used or requested during times of divided
government, as there are still significant benefits to gaining perspective from
the people who will be implementing and interpreting the legislation.175
Finally, technical help from legislative counsel and the executive branch
also factor into decisions on drafting processes because they can be a tactic
for congressional staff to accomplish policy goals during internal negotia-
tions on legislative drafts.  Assume two MCs have different policy preferences
171 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 743.
172 Id. at 747.
173 Id.
174 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2312 (2006).
175 See Jacob E. Gerson & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
2193 (2012).
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and that the committee-based drafting process leads to a conflict between the
committee chair’s preferences (or the majority’s preferences) and the prefer-
ences of an MC of the same political party.  If the committee staff member
does not want to confront the LA immediately, she can offer that they agree
to defer the decision until they receive a legislative draft back from legislative
counsel.  By eliding policy and technical drafting recommendations, staff use
legislative counsel or executive branch technical assistance as a sword or
shield against other staff members.  Thus, when the draft returns from legis-
lative counsel, instead of arguing on the policy merits, the committee staff
member can appeal to authority, arguing to the LA for the dissenting MC
that legislative counsel (or the executive branch) provided technical help
that necessitates drafting in a specific way.  While this tactic may seem far-
fetched, in the context of LAs who may not have law degrees or extensive
experience with statutory drafting—and in a context in which dissent and
disagreement have (even minor) political costs in a repeat game—the tactic
can help the committee staffer diffuse the situation without engaging in a
policy confrontation and allow the LA to avoid a direct confrontation.
IV. LEGISLATIVE DRAFTING AND LEGAL DEBATES
The typology of the origins of legislation provides more than just a
deeper understanding of the legislative process.  Understanding the origins
of legislation has an impact on important debates about and features of the
administrative state.  This Part identifies three areas in which a deeper under-
standing of the origins of legislation adds to or requires rethinking existing
debates.  First, it shows how diversity in drafting contributes to debates over
theories of statutory interpretation.  Second, it argues that legislative origins
can illuminate methodological issues about the use and reliability of legisla-
tive history.  Finally, it explores how the executive role in drafting might
require revisiting debates about delegation and deference.
A. Revisiting Theories of Statutory Interpretation
Given that statutory interpretation questions are a significant part of the
Supreme Court’s docket,176 it is no surprise that theories of statutory inter-
pretation have been hotly debated.  Traditionally, the debate in the field of
statutory interpretation focused on the differences between textualism, inten-
tionalism, purposivism, dynamic theory, and imaginary reconstruction.  In
recent years, the clash between proponents of these theories (and particu-
larly between textualists and purposivists) has become less and less fierce,
with scholars now largely agreeing that textualism and purposivism are con-
verging.177  While it is beyond the scope of this Article to engage in a full
176 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 13–14 (1997).
177 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Three Symmetries Between Textualist and Purposivist Theories of
Statutory Interpretation—and the Irreducible Roles of Values and Judgment Within Both, 99
CORNELL L. REV. 685 (2014); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (2006); see also Caleb Nelson, What is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005)
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debate between textualism and purposivism, it is worth pointing out a few
places in which an understanding of the origins of legislation can contribute
to these debates.
First, this account of the origins of legislative drafting might be taken as
evidence in support of textualist arguments.  Textualism can be rooted in a
variety of justifications, including textual constitutional requirements178 and
structural concerns linked to the nondelegation doctrine.179  But textualism
can also be justified based on judicial economy grounds—that the complex-
ity of the legislative process imposes significant costs on interpreters and that
these costs outweigh the benefits of engaging in purposivist endeavors.180
The many different pathways for legislative drafting and sources involved
could be seen as support for the judicial economy justification for textualism,
though it also requires believing that the costs outweigh the benefits even as
greater clarity about the legislative process reduces the costs of judicial
understanding.
On the other hand, there are strong arguments that attention to the
legislative process and the use of legislative history themselves have constitu-
tional roots.181  For adherents to this view, the origins of legislation provide
greater information and clarity to the legislative process, deepening and
sharpening knowledge of how the process works and what materials might be
relevant in particular cases.
Finally, the variety in the origins of legislative drafts contributes to schol-
arship that is increasingly pointing toward an “anti-universalist” approach to
statutory interpretation.182  Most prominent theories of statutory interpreta-
tion are similar in that they are “universalist” with respect to the procedures
used in Congress.183  That is, the usual theories of interpretation generally
do not assume that different statutes or statutory provisions should be inter-
preted differently based on congressional procedure or substantive issue
area.
(arguing that the differences between textualists and intentionalism are less categorical
than assumed, and largely turn on the rules versus standards debate).
178 Article I, Section 7 outlines the legislative process in a formal way that some textual-
ists argue is a source of their interpretive method. See John F. Manning, What Divides Textu-
alists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 99 (2006).
179 John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
706–07 (1997) (linking a non-delegation justification to bicameralism and presentment
requirements).
180 Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 7, at 887, 921–22, 929–31 (arguing that the judici-
ary does not have the capacity to understand the workings of Congress).
181 Article I, Section 5 gives Congress the power to “determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings,” and requires each House to “keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to
time publish the same.”  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1, 3. For a discussion of these clauses as
the foundation for legislative history usage, see James J. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the
Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1199, 1217–24 (2010).
182 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 798.
183 See id. at 797.
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The universalism of the leading theories of statutory interpretation
stems largely from the legal fiction of a unitary drafter with singular legisla-
tive intent184—despite the fact that most scholars embrace Max Radin’s clas-
sic realist claim that there is no such thing as a unified, singular “legislative
intent.”185  The legal process school responded to the realist attack by inter-
preting legislative intent not as the particular intent of the legislature, but as
the more general intent of “reasonable persons pursuing reasonable pur-
poses reasonably.”186  Theories of dynamic interpretation187 and imaginative
reconstruction188 likewise assume a discernable legislative intent—albeit one
that is modernized to address changed circumstances or unforeseen chal-
lenges.  Textualists reject legislative intent per se, in favor of the statutory
command of the legislature.189  But they, too, embrace a universalist doc-
trine—textual plain meaning.  Textualists assume a unitary drafter because,
as Professor John Manning has said, “the legislative process is simply too com-
plex and too opaque to permit judges to get inside Congress’s ‘mind.’”190
Even antifoundational, eclectic theories of statutory interpretation—such as
the pragmatic approach favored by Eskridge and Frickey191—assume a uni-
tary drafter.  Eskridge and Frickey take a highly contextual approach when it
comes to “textual, historical, and evolutive evidence,” but they do not wade
into the intricacies of legislative structure and process.192
More recently, scholars have begun to question whether the prevailing
universalism in statutory interpretation makes sense with respect to congres-
sional procedure and practice.193  Professors Bressman and Gluck have
argued for abandoning the “universalist” approach that assumes a single
regime “applies to all statutory drafters, types of statutes, legislative processes,
184 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 9, at 915 (“For instance, the fiction of the unitary
drafter—the idea that all laws are drafted by the same group of legislators—undergirds a
huge number of interpretive rules applied by textualists and purposivists alike.  But this
principle, as even the Justices who use it admit, is most certainly false.  So, too, is the notion
of a single ‘congressional intent,’ although purposivists continue to assert that such a fic-
tion is useful nonetheless.”).
185 Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930).  On fictions,
see Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405,
503–04 (1989).
186 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1378 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
187 E.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 50 (1994).
188 E.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983).
189 SCALIA, supra note 176, at 31 (“I object to the use of legislative history on principle,
since I reject intent of the legislature as the proper criterion of the law.”).
190 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2390 (2003).
191 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990).
192 Id. at 322.
193 See Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18; Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a
Multifarious Enterprise, 104 NW. L. REV. 1559 (2010).
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subject matters, and agencies.”194  They note that there is an anti-universalist
tendency already emerging, given the increasing number of subject-specific
canons of statutory interpretation,195 and they suggest that statutory interpre-
tation should go further and consider committee jurisdiction, subject area,
and whether the legislation was omnibus, ordinary, or appropriations.196
Professor Nourse has identified other granular factors in the congressional
process: specificity of the provision, the latest time in which the provision was
debated, and whether the author of legislative history was a winner or loser in
the debate.197
While this is not the place for a full theory of anti-universalism, the diver-
sity of the origins of legislation suggests further engagement with this emerg-
ing anti-universalist trend in statutory interpretation.  An anti-universalist
approach to statutory interpretation could operate at both the substantive
and procedural levels.  At the substantive level, it would distinguish between
topics of statutory interpretation, as subject-specific canons of interpretation
do.198  At the procedural level, anti-universalism involves attention to the spe-
cific path that legislation takes through Congress.  This is where understand-
ing the legislation’s origin story comes in.
What might this mean in practice?  For those who adhere strongly to
identifying legislative intent, understanding the origins of legislation can be
important for determining statutory meaning.  An omnibus vehicle includes
multiple different pieces of legislation, each of which might have been
drafted according to different processes and by different authors—and with a
different purpose.  Single-subject legislation might sometimes be drafted in a
bipartisan way, sometimes in a partisan way, sometimes by a single author.
The intent or purpose of a given provision might differ based on these ori-
gins.199  The typology of origin stories presented here shows even greater
diversity—and would be taken into account in the interpretive process.
For those who adhere to a strong form of textualism, understanding the
origins of legislation would also have anti-universalist payoffs.  Consider the
use of the whole act rule, a technique of statutory interpretation upon which
textualists often rely.200  Under the whole act rule, words used in two differ-
ent parts of the same statute should, all things being equal, be presumed to
mean the same thing.201  The formalist, albeit fictional, justification for this
rule is that there is a unitary drafter who likely used the same word in the
same way throughout the statute—and who used different words and differ-
194 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 797.
195 Id. at 798.
196 Id.
197 Nourse, supra note 2, at 110.
198 For example, the Rule of Lenity applies only in criminal cases.  For an overview, see
CALEB NELSON, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 108–09 (2011).
199 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 760–62 (arguing for distinguishing between
single-subject, omnibus, and appropriations legislation).
200 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365,
376 (1990).
201 Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974).
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ent sections to accomplish different things.202  The functional justification is
to encourage consistency and policy coherence.203  Understanding legislative
origins places some methodological limits on the appropriateness of the
whole act rule.  In the case of omnibus legislation, or even in situations where
one MC’s bill has been attached onto a larger legislative vehicle, the formalist
justification is on shaky ground, as the drafter is in fact not unitary.  Rather,
different drafters might have used the same word with different meanings in
mind.  The functional justification for the whole act rule remains, but for
textualists seeking to narrow judicial discretion, it is problematic.  The func-
tional justification relies not on judges following the command of the legisla-
ture, but on their preference for sensible policy.  This is not to say that the
whole act rule is always inappropriate for textualists, only that the weight it is
given, like the weight that the whole code and in pari materia rules are given,
might need to vary based on the context.  In this sense, textualists can learn
from the origins of legislation in an anti-universalist way—and without
becoming purposivists.
B. The Sources and Use of Legislative History
Understanding the origins of legislation is also helpful for identifying
the appropriate sources of legislative history.  Although willingness to use leg-
islative history is a difference between textualists and purposivists,204 even
Justice Scalia and other textualists who routinely criticize legislative history
sometimes consult it to illustrate meanings that are demonstrably false.205
For purposivists (and even some textualists), the question is thus not whether
legislative history is used, but “how it is best used.”206  For more extreme
textualists, a deeper understanding of the pitfalls of legislative history use,
from the perspective of congressional drafting, might sharpen their critiques
when they believe the practice is being used inappropriately.  Again, it is
beyond the scope of this Article to engage in a full debate on the uses and
abuses of legislative history.  But understanding the origins of legislation can
help move debates about legislative history forward.
First, take a simple example: when legislation is drafted through a bipar-
tisan committee-based process, the statements of Democrats and Republicans
202 ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 23, at 273.
203 Anita S. Krishnakumar, Statutory Interpretation in the Roberts Court’s First Era: An Empir-
ical and Doctrinal Analysis, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 221, 244 (2010).
204 Molot, supra note 177, at 38–39.
205 See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (“I think it entirely appropriate to consult all public materi-
als, including . . . the legislative history of [Rule 609(a)(1)’s] adoption, to verify that what
seems to us an unthinkable disposition . . . was indeed unthought of . . . .”); James J.
Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ Reliance on Legislative History: Principle, Strategy,
and the Scalia Effect, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 117 (2008) (identifying an overall decline
in legislative history but providing empirical data showing that the Court continues to use
legislative history).
206 Nourse, supra note 2, at 72.
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(who supported the draft) on the committee might all be considered rele-
vant statements.  In contrast, when legislation is drafted through a partisan
committee process, the statements of only the party members who drafted
the legislation would be relevant.  For a more complex example, consider
Senator Al Franken’s (D-MN) Accelerated Learning Act of 2013.207  As noted
above, that stand-alone bill—drafted by Senator Franken and his staff—
appears virtually word-for-word in the partisan, committee-based draft of the
ESEA reauthorization as Subpart 2 of Title I, Part B.208  In essence, Franken’s
bill was simply dropped into the larger bill’s text.  Although the overall ESEA
legislation is ascribed to committee chairman Senator Tom Harkin,209 Sena-
tor Franken’s comments on that portion of the bill should have greater
weight than Chairman Harkin’s comments on that part of the bill.
This internal committee perspective has gone unnoticed.  In a sense, it
parallels Professors Bressman and Gluck’s account of the relevance of legisla-
tive history from chamber leadership.  Professors Bressman and Gluck’s
research shows that congressional staff generally believe that the statements
of House and Senate leadership with respect to legislative text are compara-
tively unreliable, because the leadership are not generally involved in draft-
ing legislative language (that has gone through committee) and are primarily
concerned with the politics of navigating their chamber and securing passage
of the bill.210  This same dynamic exists to a lesser degree within committees.
Chairmen are often responsible for major legislation—but portions of that
legislation might be at the initiative of individual members, such as in the
Franken case.  While the chair takes credit (and responsibility) for the whole
legislation—just as chamber leadership does later in the process—an individ-
ual MC will often be the leader for their portion of the legislation.  As a
matter of professional comity, and as a way for MCs to gain credit at home for
their work, other MCs will often defer to members on particular issues where
they have shown leadership.
Second, understanding more about legislative drafting (and in particu-
lar, the role of MCs as decisionmakers and the variety of sources MCs rely
upon in making decisions) also helps provide a theoretical justification for
the hierarchy of legislative sources: MCs undertake costly signals to indicate
what materials are appropriate as a matter of legislative history.
Conventionally, the sources of legislative history are understood as fall-
ing into a hierarchy, with some sources perceived as “inherently better” than
207 Accelerated Learning Act of 2013, S. Res. 1082, 113th Cong. (2013); Sen. Franken
Introduces Bill to Help Make College Affordable, Improve Opportunities for Students, AL FRANKEN
U.S. SENATOR FOR MINN. (May 23, 2013), http://www.franken.senate.gov/?p=hot_topic&id
=2424.
208 See Strengthening America’s Schools Act of 2013, S. Res. 1094, 113th Cong.
§§ 1221–26 (2013); see also supra notes 98–100 and accompanying text.
209 S. Res. 1094; HELP Chairman Tom Harkin Introduces the “Strengthening Schools Act of
2013”: Bill Summary, SENATE HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS COMM., http://
www.help.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ESEA%20Summary%206.4.13.pdf.
210 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 757.
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others: “committee reports are better than author statements, and author
statements are better than the statements of hearing witnesses.”211  Some
scholars have noted that this hierarchy is “poorly theorized”212 and others
have even characterized it as “wrong.”213  Of defenders of legislative history
usage, Professor Nourse provides the leading critique of the hierarchy of
sources, arguing that the legislative history’s appropriateness should not be
determined primarily by “essentialist category” (e.g., committee report,
author statement).214  Rather, relevant legislative history is the “last, most
specific decision related to the interpretive question.”215  The reason is easy
to understand: the particular issue may be raised at different points in the
legislative process, and the legislation might change throughout the process.
The most important legislative history, then, cannot possibly be a committee
report if the relevant text changed after the committee report was written.
Post-committee legislative materials would be the relevant sources.  Similarly,
it may be that earlier legislative history sources speak more precisely to the
issue at hand than later-in-time legislative history sources.  The key is specific-
ity and relevance to the textual provision.  While Nourse’s approach is per-
suasive as a matter of legislative history methodology, it is incomplete
because we still need to distinguish between various sources of legislative
history.
Other scholars and jurists criticize legislative history as inappropriate
because staff, rather than MCs, write it.216  Scholars have now shown that
staff write virtually everything: text and legislative history of all types.217  The
staff-versus-member distinction is therefore unhelpful.  Another critique is
that legitimacy is tied to the MC’s knowledge, even if the MC hasn’t written
the text herself.  Justice Scalia thus argues that “genuine knowledge is a pre-
condition for the supposed authoritativeness of a committee report, and not
a precondition for the authoritativeness of a statute.”218  But if genuine
knowledge is essential to the relevance of legislative materials, then virtually
no legislative materials would be considered appropriate (which Justice
Scalia might welcome).  Of course, the text need not rely on the genuine
knowledge theory, as it gains legitimacy from the Article I process.  But
almost all materials in which genuine knowledge is involved are non-public
sources (memoranda from staff to MCs, conversations between staff and
211 Nourse, supra note 2, at 108; see also NELSON, supra note 198, at 362–63; George A.
Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The Relative Reliability of Commit-
tee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 41–42
(recounting the standard hierarchy).
212 Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1880 (1998).
213 Nourse, supra note 2, at 109–10.
214 Id. at 110.
215 Id.
216 See SCALIA, supra note 176, at 34.
217 Gluck & Bressman, supra note 9, at 983; Nourse & Schacter, supra note 15, at
620–21.
218 SCALIA, supra note 176, at 34.
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MCs, and in some cases, the floor summaries written by the cloakroom staff)
or semi-public and public sources that staff might use to inform members
(section-by-section summaries of legislation, press releases, and summaries by
interest groups).  Indeed, if we take the “genuine knowledge” theory to its
logical conclusion, the most “formal” sources are the least relevant to deci-
sionmaking.  According to empirical research from Bressman and Gluck,
committee reports and legislative text might never be relied upon in actual
legislative decisionmaking.219  A “genuine knowledge” theory therefore can-
not support textualism; it must rely on the formal process in Article I, judicial
economy, or other justifications.
Understanding that MCs are decisionmakers, not drafters, suggests an
alternative theory for the hierarchy of sources.  As a result, the relevant ques-
tions are not who wrote what or even who read what.  The default presump-
tion should be that MCs never draft any of the documents.  Flipping the
default presumption in this manner, the question becomes what the MC
decided with respect to different documents.
With this question, focus shifts to the type of document and the process
that it goes through—through this process, MCs in effect signal the degree to
which they think the document is appropriate as part of the legislative
record.  We can think of this as a costly signaling theory of legislative his-
tory,220 in which the relevance of legislative materials is dependent on the
MC’s signaling that the materials can and should be relied upon.  As with
costly signaling theories more broadly,221 the key assumptions are first, that
the statement represents the MC’s, committee’s, or chamber’s understanding
of the interpretation of the language, and second, that the court can use the
“quality” of the statement—which is “shorthand for what one might think of
as the more superficial aspects of quality (polish, thoroughness, detail, com-
plexity, raw length),”222 and in the congressional context also includes who
the audience is and whether the statement takes place within the Congress—
as a proxy for the costs incurred in producing the interpretation.  With these
conditions in mind, courts can reason that the interpretation offered is more
or less reliable.  More reliable interpretations are more costly as a matter of
signaling; less reliable interpretations are cheaper.
Signaling theory provides a justification for the hierarchy of materials
because legislative materials fall along a spectrum in terms of costliness to
produce and links to legislative debate.  All legislative materials go through a
different degree of internal legislative processes before they are made public
(if ever).  Some materials are never made public (e.g., internal memoranda
between staff and members), and MCs have therefore decided they are not
intended for use as legislative history.  Other materials go through some pro-
cess—a speech to the local high school, a press release.  These materials are
219 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 740.
220 See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review,
58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753 (2006).
221 See id.
222 Id. at 755.
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developed through a more intensive process that signals the MC’s decision
that the text in these documents is intended as part of public debate.  Still
other materials go through significant processes that signal relevance as part
of the legislative record: floor speeches take place within the chamber itself,
colloquies are elaborately choreographed in cooperation with others, and
committee and conference reports require negotiation and are voted upon.
At the pinnacle of legitimacy is the legislative text itself—which follows the
most stringent process, Article I, Section 7, and which the MC decides
whether to support or not.  In a sense, this alternative theory of legislative
materials derives directly from Justice Scalia’s formalist preferences: the legit-
imacy of legislative materials is tied to the process undertaken based on a
genuine decision of the MC—but the MC’s role is in decisionmaking about
materials, not policy substance about what is in the materials.223
In other words, as a practice, MCs signal the relevance of certain materi-
als over others.  Reports they vote on are more relevant than speeches they
give or public documents written under their name.  A speech to a constitu-
ent group will send a different signal, for example, than a speech dissecting
the bill, section-by-section, on the floor.224  Some have worried that state-
ments by MCs are simply just “sales talk,” designed to persuade but not to
capture the true meaning of the text.225  To be sure, MCs often simplify their
statements—for example, a speech to the local rotary club touting banking
reform legislation will put a positive spin on the legislation but is unlikely to
go into much detail.  Contrast a long, detailed speech on banking reform to
the trade association of community banks.  The MC cannot be engaged in
“sales talk” of the crude type that some have suggested.226  If the member is
misleading or inaccurate when getting into details of interpretation or actual
statutory provisions, the audience will either know and the member will lose
credibility with them, or the audience will rely detrimentally on what they
hear and, upon finding out that the information was wrong, the member will
lose credibility with them.  Between these two examples is a spectrum of
cases, but the point here is that the nature of the material, by virtue of its
quality, can serve as a signal as to its relevance.  Understanding how legisla-
tive drafts and materials are used enables this kind of interpretation.
223 Note that the relationship between authority of a text and the process used to create
it is a central feature of administrative law’s treatment of statutes, regulations, and gui-
dance documents.  Statutes go through extensive process and can only be overturned for
constitutional reasons.  Regulations have less extensive and legitimate processes under-
girding them and thus gain less judicial deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).  Guidance documents have less procedural legiti-
macy and are afforded still less deference. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218
(2001).
224 The former will be more likely to be “sales talk” than the latter.  Eskridge, supra
note 200, at 402.
225 Id.
226 Cf. id.; see also Reed Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: Dipping into Legislative History,
11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1125, 1132 (1983) (arguing that floor debates are “laden with sales
talk”).
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This approach to legislative history accords better with the reality of how
Congress functions.  The actual author of the draft—rarely if ever an MC—is
not relevant.  Nor are the actual materials upon which the MC made the
decision to support the legislation.  What matters is whether and how the
MCs signal that their statements are part of the legislative or public record.
This approach accounts for the full variety of legislative materials—public,
semi-public, and non-public—even though some are used in decisionmaking
and some are not.  Text retains the most important role, but other materi-
als—committee and conference reports, colloquies, floor speeches, even op-
eds and press releases—can be reliable as well.227  And perhaps most impor-
tantly, it does not rely on the fiction that MCs draft documents or that MCs
or their staffs read documents.  What matters is the decision to introduce
those documents into the public or legislative record.228
C. The Executive Role in Drafting the Laws
One of the most interesting—and most important—insights from under-
standing the origins of legislation is that the executive branch participates
extensively in legislative drafting, whether by drafting entire statutes or by
providing technical assistance throughout the drafting process.  Although
scholars undoubtedly recognize that legislation emerges from negotiation
with the President (because the President’s consent, or a veto override, is
necessary for passage), legal scholarship has not thoroughly explored the
practice of executive branch drafting and technical assistance for administra-
tive law.229  Yet its significance is potentially extensive.  While a full theoreti-
cal account of the implications must be left to another time and place, it is
worth outlining the basic contours of the problem and identifying some of
the possible avenues for further research.
227 It is worth noting that some sources, maligned as “sales talk,” can still be useful for
understanding the “public history” of the statute. See SCALIA, supra note 176, at 30;
Vermeule, supra note 212, at 1836.
228 In an important sense, this approach aligns with Professor Victoria Nourse’s “legisla-
tive decision theory.”  Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legis-
lative Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613, 1614 (2014).
229 The literature applying game theory and positive political theory to negotiations
between the President and Congress, particularly with reference to the control of adminis-
trative agencies, is expansive. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article
I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey, Separated Powers and Positive
Political Theory: The Tug of War over Administrative Agencies, 80 GEO. L.J. 671 (1992).  Still, this
work does not address statutory drafting practice.  The executive role in drafting has hith-
erto only been examined in a limited fashion.  For example, Samuel Huntington remarks
on this phenomenon, but does not discuss it.  Samuel P. Huntington, Congressional
Responses to the Twentieth Century, in CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 7, 24 (Ronald C. Moe ed.,
1971).  The most extensive historical discussion is in Parrillo, supra note 132.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 47  8-DEC-15 16:29
2015] the  origins  of  legislation 125
1. Delegation and the Principal-Agent Problem
One of the central principles of our legal system is that “a fusion of law-
making and law-exposition is especially dangerous to our liberties.”230  The
concern is so great that some scholars have even suggested that judicial defer-
ence to agency interpretations of their own rules—what is called Seminole
Rock231 deference—is constitutionally suspect because of this principle.232
The argument is that if the same people who write the laws (or in the case of
Seminole Rock, the regulations) can interpret them, there is no check on the
exercise of power.  If we take this principle seriously, one possible conclusion
might be that executive participation in drafting the laws is extremely troub-
ling.  Of course, as a formal matter, our constitutional system gives the execu-
tive a role in the legislative process, both through presentment before a bill
becomes a law233 and through the executive’s power to “recommend” to
Congress “such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient.”234  But
as a theoretical matter, scholarly frameworks do not engage sufficiently with
this practice.
Consider the standard, simplified models for legislative-executive rela-
tions.  On the delegation story, Congress delegates power to agencies to act
in certain ways, and the agencies then do so.  The explanations for delega-
tion vary.  Political scientists often reference legislators’ desire to serve con-
stituents; to take credit for advantageous policies and shift blame to agencies
for objectionable policies; to establish a racket that leads to further campaign
contributions; and to punt decisions on which compromise is difficult.235
Legal academics have noted that congressional delegation is inevitable (and
desirable) in a complex society in which division of labor is necessary,236 and
they stress agencies’ comparative expertise as a reason undergirding congres-
sional delegation.237
The delegation story, however, is far richer than is conventionally
depicted.  In many cases, the executive may assist Congress in suggesting
what topics are worthy of delegation, how much power to delegate, how that
230 John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations
of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 617 (1996).
231 Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945).  For a discussion of the
scope of Seminole Rock, see Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock’s
Domain, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1449 (2011).
232 Manning, supra note 230.
233 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
234 Id. art. II, § 3.
235 See, e.g., DAVID EPSTEIN & SHARYN O’HALLORAN, DELEGATING POWERS 30–32 (1999)
(reviewing the arguments in political science).
236 Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1721, 1744 (2002).
237 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 22–23 (1938) (viewing administra-
tive agencies as expert managers); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245, 2261 (2001) (discussing expertise as a justification for bureaucratic power).
Political scientists, of course, mention these features too. See, e.g., EPSTEIN & O’HALLORAN,
supra note 235.
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power might be used, and what resources are necessary to execute on the
delegation.  In other words, delegation is not simply a unilateral congres-
sional decision—it is a joint endeavor, a cooperative effort to establish a
framework for policymaking.  Two other facts are worth noting.  First, a par-
ticipating agency might not be seeking to aggrandize its power through dele-
gation;238 rather, in some cases, it might advise Congress to narrow the scope
of delegations because it is resource-constrained or fears being blamed if it
cannot manage the delegated authority effectively.  Note also that for those
who prefer a more robust nondelegation doctrine, it is not obvious that
nondelegation would mitigate executive participation.  Enforcement of
nondelegation might simply force greater executive participation into the
drafting process, as the executive’s expertise would be of greater importance
in the initial statutory drafting.  This fact still blurs the distinction between
lawmaking and law-exposition.
Executive drafting also has implications for the principal-agent frame-
work to delegation.239  If the central concern with agency costs240 is princi-
pal-agent drift based on an informational deficiency (i.e., the agency does
not know what Congress intended),241 that problem is mitigated significantly
by executive participation in the drafting process, at least when regulations
are promulgated close in time to the statute’s passage.  Greater executive par-
ticipation should reduce the agency’s information deficit and the likelihood
of drift.  However, if the central concern is a bad-faith agency that seeks to act
outside the scope of the intended delegated authority,242 then executive par-
ticipation in drafting is more problematic.  As is the concern with Seminole
238 Cf. Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 915 (2005).
239 For an example of this approach, see Barry R. Weingast, The Congressional-Bureau-
cratic System: A Principal Agent Perspective (with Applications to the SEC), 44 PUB. CHOICE 147
(1984).
240 For the classic discussion, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the
Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
241 Cf. Kathleen Bawn, Political Control Versus Expertise: Congressional Choices About Admin-
istrative Procedures, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 63 (1995) (arguing that “the degree of agency
independence on any particular policy reflects the legislature’s willingness to trade uncer-
tainty about policy consequences for uncertainty about agency behavior”).
242 See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Dele-
gated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1454 (2003) (“[D]elegation allows agencies to exploit
their discretion and pursue their own policy agendas—to defy Congress and simply do as
they please.  Viewed in this light, agency officials are rational actors, who may seek to
expand their authority, enlarge their budgets, ensure their survival, improve their future
employment prospects, or otherwise pursue interests that may not coincide with those of
Congress.”).  On this approach, agency drift could be a function of the agencies’ prefer-
ences, see, e.g., Matthew [sic] D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy:
Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 435–40
(1989), or of interest group influence operating through the agency, see, e.g., Jonathan R.
Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 93, 100 (1992).
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Rock, the agency might be creating opportunities to give itself discretion it
can abuse.
In addition, the conventional solutions to narrowing the principal-agent
drift problem do not contemplate executive participation in drafting as a
remedy.  The conventional ex post solution is congressional oversight
through police patrols and fire alarms.243  The conventional ex ante solution
is for Congress to establish well-defined administrative procedures.244
Because executive participation in drafting can reduce the informational
deficiency problem, it operates as an additional ex ante strategy for Congress
to prevent agency drift.  Importantly, ex ante participation in drafting might
also improve ex post oversight, as MCs can criticize agencies for acting
against what they knew as the shared understanding of the legislation.245
2. Agency Statutory Interpretation
An alternative model for the legislative process, as Professor Ed Rubin
has argued, understands legislation as setting public policy goals, rather than
creating “law,” understood as primary directives aimed at individuals.246  On
this theory, it may be better to interpret Congress and the executive as part-
ners—working together to set and then implement public policy goals.  As
Rubin argues, broad delegations and vague wording are not an abdication of
legislative responsibility because the control of implementation is not limited
to the specificity of articulated rules.247  Instead, implementation can be
shaped and controlled through a variety of political means: oversight, letters,
hearings, appropriations, publicity, investigations, and the like.  On this the-
ory, the simple separation-of-powers and delegation models are simply irrele-
vant because they “rest on the old-fashioned and abstract idea that power can
be doled out in discrete portions to those who implement the statute.”248
As a practical matter, this approach to addressing the insight of the exec-
utive role in drafting has implications for the ongoing debate on the practice
of agency statutory interpretation.  In particular, it lends support to scholars
who claim that the practice of statutory interpretation in agencies is distinct
from how courts interpret statutes.249  As Professors Peter Strauss and Jerry
243 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked:
Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165 (1984).
244 See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
245 Cf. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 242, at 1446–47 (2003) (noting that committees
might have outsized influence in legislative oversight related to their subject area).
246 Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
369, 374, 377 (1989).
247 Id. at 393–94.
248 Id. at 408.
249 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Norms, Practices, and the Paradox of Deference: A Preliminary Inquiry
into Agency Statutory Interpretation, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 501, 504 (2005); Walker, supra note
135; see also Kevin M. Stack, Purposivism in the Executive Branch, 109 NW. L. REV. (forthcom-
ing); Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read:
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321 (1990).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 50  8-DEC-15 16:29
128 notre dame law review [vol. 91:1
Mashaw have argued, agencies, unlike courts, are constantly in dialogue with
Congress,250 they are subject to executive orders and directives,251 and they
have different duties in applying constitutional avoidance doctrines.252
These differences suggest that agencies invariably face different pressures
than courts, and that agency interpretations will be influenced by different
sources (e.g., executive orders).  Christopher Walker’s recent survey con-
firms that agency rule-drafters see themselves, not courts, as the primary
interpreters of statutes—and that some sources of interpretation, such as leg-
islative history, can be more helpful to an agency than to a court.253  At an
even more granular level, some scholars have argued that an agency’s choice
of policymaking format—rulemaking or formal adjudication—will shape an
agency’s interpretive practices.254  In response, other scholars have argued
that agency statutory interpretation must not diverge from (and is
subordinate to) judicial interpretation, particularly under Chevron step
one.255
The executive’s role in legislative drafting provides additional support to
the Strauss-Mashaw thesis that agency interpretive practice can and should
diverge from judicial interpretive practice.  First, Strauss and Mashaw focus
primarily on the post-enactment relationship between Congress and agen-
cies,256 but the pre-enactment relationship between Congress and agencies is
just as robust.  In cases of executive branch authorship, agencies are actually
the primary drafters of the legislation.257  In other cases, congressional com-
mittees might have agencies participate in the drafting process, working with
the committee to develop the policy, providing feedback and participating in
discussion.  In still other cases, agencies might provide “technical assistance,”
not just on policy but also on specific statutory language and authorities.258
Each of these features of the legislative drafting process gives the agency sub-
stantial pre-enactment information as to the meaning of the legislation.  At
the minimum, in situations in which the agency engages in statutory interpre-
tation in close temporal proximity to the passage of legislation, it seems rea-
sonable to say that the agency has a greater ability to divine congressional
250 Mashaw, supra note 249, at 512; Strauss, supra note 249, at 329.
251 Mashaw, supra note 249, at 506–07.
252 Id. at 507–08.
253 Walker, supra note 135, at 1051–52, 1038–40.
254 Kevin M. Stack, Agency Statutory Interpretation and Policymaking Form, 2009 MICH. ST.
L. REV. 225.
255 Richard J. Pierce, Jr., How Agencies Should Give Meaning to the Statutes They Administer:
A Response to Mashaw and Strauss, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 197 (2007).
256 Mashaw, supra note 249, at 512 (“Nor are Presidents the only ones who engage in
post-enactment political activity relevant to statutory implementation.  Agencies are sub-
jected to legislative oversight of their implementing activity.”); Strauss, supra note 249, at
329.
257 See supra subsection II.C.1.
258 See supra Section II.D.
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intent, however defined, than do the courts.259  The agency would be likely
to understand the reasons for specific statutory language, the context leading
to deliberate ambiguities or delegation, and the political pressures operating
inside and outside Congress.  After all, the agency was in the room.
Second, as some scholars have noted, congressional staff writes legisla-
tive history with agencies in mind.260  On this approach, MCs create legisla-
tive history to guide and constrain agency action during statutory
interpretation and implementation.  When the agency is involved in interpre-
tation and implementation, MCs can rely on that legislative history in over-
sight hearings, letters, and other post-enactment interactions with the
agency.261  In other words, legislative history is part of an ongoing dialogue
between the agency and Congress, one that proceeds relatively seamlessly
from drafting to interpretation to implementation.  The use of legislative his-
tory may therefore be particularly suitable as part of agency interpretive
practice.
3. Judicial Review and Deference Doctrines
Another approach to the executive’s role in drafting might suggest that,
at least in some situations, courts should grant greater deference to agencies.
If the executive is involved in drafting legislation, then it will have special
insight into what the goals and intentions behind the legislation actually
were, what the political and practical compromises were, and how MCs
thought about specific problems throughout the legislative process.  This
could take two approaches.
First, a court could consider the agency’s interactions with Congress as
part of its review under Chevron262 and State Farm.263  In considering the
space in which the agency can act under Chevron,264 courts could consider
whether the agency participated in drafting and whether the challenged
interpretation was contemplated in the drafting process.  If the agency and
Congress considered the interpretation in their deliberations, courts might
consider it a reasonable interpretation of the statute under Chevron.  Simi-
larly, courts might consider agency participation in drafting under State Farm
259 Indeed, agencies seem to have made these arguments to the Supreme Court in the
late 1930s and 1940s, citing legislative history to support their case. See Parrillo, supra note
132, at 367.
260 Bressman & Gluck, supra note 18, at 768 (noting that Congress’s audience for legis-
lative history is agencies).
261 Indeed, we should expect that the MCs who were highly active in the legislative
process on a specific statute would play an important—even oversized—role in later over-
sight.  Legal scholars have suggested this possibility at the committee level but have not
generalized the point to adapt to the diversity of legislative processes. See DeShazo & Free-
man, supra note 242, at 1446–47.
262 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
263 Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
264 Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and
“Skidmore Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143 (2012).
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as part of the factors they use to evaluate whether agency actions are arbitrary
and capricious.265  Evidence that a policy pursued through regulation was
contemplated during the drafting process might be a factor that cuts in favor
of deference to the agency.266
Second, courts could vary deference based on the temporal proximity of
agency action to the legislative action in which the agency participated.  In a
case of executive drafting, the comparative expertise of the agency will be
strongest immediately after the legislation was passed, and it will grow weaker
over time.  As a result, greater deference might be warranted if agencies
interpret or implement legislation soon after it is passed.267  Prior to Chevron,
courts pursued this course explicitly, granting great weight to agency inter-
pretations issued soon after legislation was passed.268  Some textualists have
justified this practice because it provided evidence of the textual or linguistic
265 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).
266 In recent years, scholars have increasingly argued that courts should also consider
political factors in agency decisionmaking. See Katheryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Polit-
ics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009); cf. Nina A. Mendelson, Disclos-
ing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127 (2010). But see
Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 90 WASH. U. L.
REV. 141 (2012).  There is overlap in these arguments, as congressional action is in part a
political constraint on the agency.
267 This argument has also been used to justify Seminole Rock deference. See Stephenson
& Pogoriler, supra note 231, at 1454–56.  Stephenson notes that greater deference might
not be warranted to an interpretation issued close in time to a rule’s promulgation because
the agency might be “deliberately avoiding coverage of a controversial issue in the regula-
tion” and because an agency will prefer self-delegation in the short run, for fear of long
term changes in administration preferences. See id. at 1473.  It is important to note that
these arguments against this approach in the Seminole Rock context are less applicable in
the context of executive drafting.  First, while Congress might be avoiding controversy by
delegating to the agency, the agency then must engage the controversial issue during
rulemaking.  Second, MCs will likely prefer immediate agency interpretations and imple-
mentation of a statutory scheme for fear that future agencies and future congresses will
drift from the enacting Congress’s preferences. Cf. Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A. Shepsle,
Commentary on “Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies”: Administrative
Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L. REV. 499, 503
(1989) (describing legislative drift over time).
268 See, e.g., United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 549 (1940); Nor-
wegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 315 (1933) (“The practice [def-
erence] has peculiar weight when it involves a contemporaneous construction of a statute
by the men charged with the responsibility of setting its machinery in motion, of making
the parts work efficiently and smoothly while they are yet untried and new.”); Stephen
Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 368–69 (1986);
Colin S. Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
565–67 (1985).  For a discussion of recent references to deference based on contempora-
neous construction, see Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern
Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1235, 1289–90 (2007).  For a useful overview of the
history from 1827 to the present, see Peter L. Strauss, In Search of Skidmore, 83 FORDHAM L.
REV. 789 (2014).
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context at the time of passage,269 but the practice could also be justified
based on the agency’s participation in the legislative process.  Indeed, in the
1930s and 1940s, prior to the expansion of congressional staff, Justice Depart-
ment lawyers and executive branch officials were frequently ghostwriters for
Congress, drafting legislation, speeches, and committee reports.270  Agency
lawyers in the early 1940s even argued to the Supreme Court that the Court
should defer to the agency’s interpretation, citing legislative history describ-
ing the agency’s role in working with Congress to define statutory goals and
terms.271
For the most part, of course, the executive role in legislative drafting is
not public, so it may be difficult—and inappropriate—to give these non-pub-
lic interactions much weight in the judicial review process.272  But in some
cases, the information is publicly available and potentially helpful.  In the
private-executive drafting process, common to the FDA’s user fee agreement
legislation, the FDA actually releases the full text of the legislation they pro-
pose to Congress, with explanations for their decisions—and they do so after
an extensive notice-and-comment process (in which their reasoning is made
available to the public).273  These documents feed directly into the legislative
process and might help provide judges with notice as to changes between
drafts—and in particular, might help judges prevent agency drift because the
courts could better identify places where Congress rejected an FDA sugges-
tion and rewrote the statute.  If the FDA later tried to adopt an interpretation
in line with its own suggested language—language that Congress rewrote—
that might indicate that the agency is drifting away from congressional com-
mand in favor of its own preferences.  The FDA’s user fee agreements go
through a particularly open process, but there are other cases of executive
involvement that are public.  For example, the Obama Administration has
frequently objected to specific language in the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Acts (NDAA) regarding detainee rules.274  The Administration issued
public pronouncements detailing its objections to very specific provisions
within the NDAA—and Congress responded by changing the statutory
terms.275  While public materials may not always be available, in some cases,
269 Manning, supra note 230, at 624 n.65; see also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.
v. Peña, 44 F.3d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring) (“[A] legal interpre-
tation adopted soon after . . . enactment may be the best evidence of the meaning the
words carried in the legal profession at the time.”).
270 Parrillo, supra note 132, at 282.
271 Id. at 282, 369–74.
272 For an example of the Supreme Court using (with some disagreement) non-public
executive branch materials, see Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984).
273 See supra subsection II.C.2.
274 See, e.g., Robert Chesney, White House Threatens Veto of NDAA, LAWFARE (June 12,
2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/06/white-house-threatens-veto-of-ndaa/.
275 See, e.g., Benjamin Wittes, This Year’s NDAA: A Big Win for the Administration on Guan-
tanamo, LAWFARE (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2013/12/this-years-ndaa-a-
big-win-for-the-administration-on-guantanamo/.
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they might prove helpful at understanding the back-and-forth between Con-
gress and the executive in the drafting process.
If courts were to adopt the greater deference approach, agencies might
also start providing courts with more information about the agency’s role in
the drafting process and the agency’s ongoing communications with congres-
sional sponsors, committees, or others about statutory implementation and
interpretation, further facilitating the practice.
CONCLUSION
The origins of legislative drafts are varied, but there are some consistent,
predictable patterns.  The typology of legislative drafting processes presented
here provides the more detailed and thorough description of legislative ori-
gins, deepening our understanding of how the legislative process works.  This
understanding also provides a variety of important implications for statutory
interpretation, the use of legislative history, and debates about delegation to
agencies and deference to their interpretations.  In a Republic of Statutes,
the origins of legislation must not be ignored.
